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NOTE
A RETURN TO PRACTICALITY: REFORMING
THE FOURTH COX EXCEPTION TO THE FINAL
JUDGMENT RULE GOVERNING SUPREME
COURT CERTIORARI REVIEW OF STATE
COURT JUDGMENTS
Gayle Gerson*
INTRODUCTION

On the last day of the Supreme Court's 2002-2003 term, corporate
and media interests eagerly awaited a decision that would provide a
long-overdue clarification of the commercial speech doctrine.' At
issue in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky2 was whether statements made by Nike in
defense of its labor practices should be protected by the First
Amendment as contributions to a public debate over a controversial
issue, or should instead be considered merely commercial speech.' If
the latter, the company could be held liable for factual inaccuracies in
its statements under California's Unfair Competition Law and False
Advertising Law.4
The trial court had dismissed plaintiff Mark Kasky's complaint that
Nike engaged in unfair and deceptive practices by making false
statements intended to facilitate its sales.5 Nike had defended the
statements, made in press releases and letters to newspapers and
universities, as responses to allegations that it was mistreating and

* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Abner Greene for his insights and guidance.
1. See, e.g., Thomas Clarke and Deborah Glass, Will Free Speech be Cowed?,
Nat'l L.J., Apr. 28, 2003, at A12 (referring to the "long-awaited" oral argument that
took place, and imploring the Court to "use the opportunity to clarify and elaborate
upon the concept of commercial speech").
2. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
3. Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring).
4. Id. Under California's Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law, a
private individual may bring suit to enforce California law on behalf of the general
public of the State of California. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500 (West 1997).
5. Nike, 539 U.S. at 656.
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underpaying its workers at foreign facilities.6 The California Court of
Appeal affirmed, holding that Nike's statements were "part of a
public dialogue on a matter of public concern within the core area of
expression protected by the First Amendment. '7 The California
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings,
holding that "[blecause the messages in question were directed by a
commercial speaker to a commercial audience, and because they
made representations of fact about the speaker's own business
operations for the purpose of promoting sales of its products... [the]
messages are commercial speech."'
Many observers expected the Supreme Court to seize upon what
appeared to be a perfect opportunity to reject and replace a
"doctrinally inconsistent, analytically flawed" test for defining
commercial speech.9 Instead, the Court issued a terse statement
announcing that "[t]he writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently
granted." 10 Scholars, practitioners and journalists decried the Court's
decision as one that would have dire consequences for all companies
doing business in California, and for corporate America in general."
What happened?
While the Court did not elaborate on its decision, Justice Stevens'
lengthy concurrence suggested the Court was concerned that, because
the California Supreme Court had not yet rendered a final decision in
the case, an assertion of appellate jurisdiction would have run afoul of
28 U.S.C. § 1257 of the United States Code. 12 The statute limits the
6. Id.
7. Id. at 656-57.
8. Id. at 657 (quoting Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P. 3d 243,247 (Cal. 2002)).
9. J. Wesley Earnhardt, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Opportunity to Define
Commercial Speech - Why Wouldn't the Supreme Court Finally "Just Do It"?, 82 N.C.
L. Rev. 797, 800 (2004).
10. Nike, 539 U.S. at 655. The Court issued a per curiam opinion. Justice Stevens
concurred in a written opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter (Souter
concurring only as to part ILL); Justice Kennedy dissented, without opinion; and
Justice Breyer dissented in a written opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor.
11. See Adam Liptak, Nike Move Ends Case Over Firms' Free Speech, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 13, 2003, at A8 (reporting that "First Amendment experts said they were
dismayed that the California court's decision would stand"); Anitha Reddy, Nike
Settles With Activist in False-Advertising Case, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 2003, at E01
(reporting that "[tihe case was considered by consumer advocates, businesses and
legal experts to be an important battle that could have clarified a murky area of First
Amendment law"); Robert J. Samuelson, The Tax on Free Speech, Newsweek, July
14, 2003, at 41 ("To anyone concerned about free speech, the failure of the Supreme
Court to rule on a case brought by Nike Inc. is more than disappointing. It's a
disaster.... [T]he practical effect is to expose Nike and other companies to expensive
trials and huge economic risks. Their choice may be to shut up or pay up.").
12. Nike, 539 U.S. at 657-58. Stevens stated:
In my judgment, the Court's decision to dismiss the writ of certiorari is
supported by three independently sufficient reasons: (1) the judgment
entered by the California Supreme Court was not final within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1257; (2) neither party has standing to invoke the jurisdiction
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Court's review to "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had."' 3 Justice
Breyer's dissent, urging that the California Supreme Court judgment
was final in the pragmatic sense in which the statute is typically
construed, 4 underscored the lack of consensus among the Justices
over how far the Court should go in reading flexibility into the final
judgment rule. The debate is a longstanding one. Indeed, even before
the turn of the twentieth century, the Court had observed that
"[p]robably no question of equity practice has been the subject of
more frequent discussion in [the Court] than the finality of decrees."15
While the final judgment rule is rooted in bedrock principles of
federalism, constitutional avoidance, and judicial efficiency,16 the
Court has long recognized that rigid adherence to the rule is often
unrealistic. Struggling to give the statute "[a] practical rather than a
technical construction,"' 7 the Court has attempted to forge exceptions
where the dangers of adhering to a strict interpretation of finalitysuch as prejudicing the petitioner or foregoing the most efficient
resolution of the dispute-outweigh the costs.'
Over time the Court has favored an increasingly liberal
interpretation of finality, expanding the number and scope of
exceptions and provoking criticism that it has allowed the rule to
become dispensable, "yielding when need be to the exigencies of
particular situations."' 9 Some feared that what had begun as a
reluctant acknowledgment that a "penumbral area" surrounds the
otherwise strict concept of a final judgment" had become instead an
eager willingness to prematurely interfere with state judicial
proceedings.
One of the most controversial exceptions allows the Court to
construe a judgment as final for purposes of appeal if the Court
determines that the judgment "might seriously erode federal policy."21
Under this exception, the Court has reviewed cases in which the
appealing party may well have prevailed in subsequent state court
proceedings on nonfederal grounds, rendering the federal issue moot,

of a federal court; and (3) the reasons for avoiding the premature
adjudication of novel constitutional questions apply with special force to this
case.
Id.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
14. Nike, 539 U.S. at 670-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15. McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536,544-45 (1892).
16. See infra Parts I.A-I.B.
17. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,546 (1949).
18. See infra Parts I.C-I.D.
19. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 572 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
20. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945).
21. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975).
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and in which there was no concern that delaying review would have
subjected the petitioner to irreparable harm.2 2 It was this exception,
institutionalized in Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn,23 that was at issue
in Nike. The company argued that a refusal to immediately review the
state court judgment that it was subject to liability for its statements
would threaten the federal policy of protecting First Amendment
speech. 4
The argument was a strong one, as the Supreme Court has applied
the fourth Cox exception in many First Amendment cases, holding
that the risk posed by a state law abridging the exercise of free speech
was simply too great to allow a court judgment upholding its validity
to stand. The Court has been similarly solicitous of other federal
policies that do not rise to the level of constitutional rights. 26 Yet
never has it satisfactorily explained why certain policies and rights
deserve to be fast-tracked to Supreme Court review, circumventing
traditional appellate routes, while others fall short of this favored
status. The Court has failed to articulate a limiting principle to
restrain its application of the fourth Cox exception.2 ' This is a
concern, critics argue, because the exception abandons principles of
federalism and comity, as well as the doctrine of avoiding
constitutional adjudication whenever possible, by preventing state
courts from potentially resolving disputes on independent state
grounds, and undermines judicial efficiency by promoting general
uncertainty about the availability of appeal.28
This Note argues that the fourth Cox exception to the final
judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 is an untenable doctrine that is
fundamentally at odds with the policies underlying the statute and is
unworkable in practice. Part I reviews the history of, and policies
behind, the final judgment rule, emphasizing the unique concerns that
accompany Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction over appeals of state
court judgments to the Supreme Court, as compared to the
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals over judgments of the federal
district courts. Part I then introduces the major exceptions the Court
has developed to the finality rule in both contexts, and outlines
common arguments for and against them.
Part II traces the development of the fourth exception to the final
judgment rule of § 1257, highlighting the Court's evolution in terms of
its willingness to find that the potential harm of delaying review
outweighs the risks inherent in granting an interlocutory appeal. The
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See infra Part II.B.
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 549 U.S. 654, 658 (2003).
See infra Part II.C.
See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.B.3.
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cases discussed demonstrate how the Court's balancing approach,
through which it purported to inject fairness and practicality into an
otherwise rigid rule, gave way to a virtual disregard of the statute's
basic underlying policy rationales. After examining this evolution,
Part II looks at how the Court has applied the exception in the years
since Cox, presenting a picture of general inconsistency regarding the
doctrine's scope.
Part III argues that the fourth Cox exception is an irrational and
impractical doctrine that undermines the policies of § 1257 without
requiring the existence of compelling countervailing interests. While
the Court has applied the exception to expedite review of
interlocutory judgments in certain deserving situations, the battle of
opinions in the Nike case demonstrates that there remains support on
the Court for a very expansive and problematic application of the
exception.29 Part III offers a critique of the exception, using Justice
Stevens' concurrence in Nike to explicate its shortcomings. First, the
exception is "virtually formless,"3 lacking clarity and predictability.
Its language seems to contemplate the availability of review for any
interlocutory order, as long as it implicates an important federal
policy. As such, the exception does not strike an appropriate balance
between the benefits of providing interlocutory review and the
potential harms, such as fostering uncertainty among litigants about
the availability of review and interfering with harmonious relations
between state and federal judicial systems. Second, the exception
contravenes the doctrine of constitutional avoidance by specifically
allowing for review of interlocutory judgments that resolve federal
questions even though the federal question may be mooted by
subsequent proceedings. Third, since it is possible in some cases that
additional federal questions could arise in subsequent state court
proceedings, the exception creates a risk that the Court will engage in
piecemeal review of federal issues, thus undermining the efficiency
benefits that the final judgment rule was meant to foster. Finally, in
applying the fourth Cox exception, the Court must necessarily flout
the traditional judicial process by considering the merits of a case
prior to determining that it has jurisdiction to hear the matter in the
first place.
Part III then proposes an alternative approach to the fourth Cox
exception. Specifically, it proposes rejecting the prong of the test that
permits the Court to base its assertion of jurisdiction on a
determination that there is some risk that a state court judgment
"might seriously erode federal policy,"31 and replacing it with a
concern for the degree to which a longstanding and erroneous state
29. Nike, 539 U.S. at 655-65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
30. Cox Broad. Corp v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 505 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 483.
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court judgment would irreparably impair the petitioner's rights. Part

III suggests that this test would weigh in favor of interlocutory review
in two situations: when a state court has upheld, refused to consider
appeal from, or refused to issue a stay of, a preliminary injunction
against speech that is of dubious constitutionality; and when a state
court judgment has rejected the petitioner's federal argument
regarding venue or jurisdiction.
A pre-trial sanction threatens immediate, ongoing, and irreparable

harm to a litigant. Rather than merely "chilling" speech, an injunction
effectively "freezes" it, preventing the exercise of the right for an
indefinite amount of time. It could be years until a trial is completed
and appeals make their way through the court system, at which point a
vindication of one's speech rights may be, at best, bittersweet, and at
worst, irrelevant. Similarly, a court's determination that it has the
power to subject a litigant to proceedings is one that can be effectively
challenged only prior to the commencement of those proceedings.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE

The final judgment rule governing appeals from state courts to the

United States Supreme Court was incorporated into section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789,32 and was carried forth in substantially the same
form in every subsequent revision of the Judicial Code.33 Today, it is
32. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (2000)). The section reads:
And be it further enacted, That a final judgment or decree in any
suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a
decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the
validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the
United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is
drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority
exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to
the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the
decision is in favour of such their validity... may be re-examined
and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States
upon a writ of error ....
Id. The roots of the final judgment rule may be found in the English writ of error, a
means by which litigants could petition the King's Court to correct errors of
judgment. See Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale
L.J. 539, 541 (1932). The common law concept of the judicial unit precluded the
reviewing court from issuing a writ of error before completion of the suit below. Id. at
543. A "conception of unity of the formal record" may explain why proceedings in
the lower court and in the reviewing court could not take place simultaneously. Id.
33. See Richard H. Fallon et al., Hart & Weschler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 466-69 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter Hart & Weschler]; Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters §
4006 (2d ed. 1996). The language of section 25 of the Act was amended in 1867, and
was subsequently reenacted as section 709 of the Revised Statutes in 1874, and as
section 237 of the Judicial Code in 1911. Hart & Weschler, supra, at 466 n.3.
Revisions to the Code in 1948 reformulated the basic provisions conferring
jurisdiction to review state court decisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Id. at 468 n.15. In the
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codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which limits Supreme Court appellate

review of state court decisions to "final judgments or decrees
rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had."34 A similar rule for appeals from federal district courts to the
federal courts of appeals, originating in section 22 of the Judiciary
Act,35 is codified in § 1291 of the Code. It provides that "[t]he courts
of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals
36 from all final

decisions of the district courts of the United States."
From a literal standpoint, a final decision is "one which ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but to

execute the judgment. '37 Yet the Court has preferred to give the final
judgment rule a "practical rather than a technical construction,"38 one

that is purportedly "more consonant to the intention of the
legislature.

39

Precisely what the legislature intended, and what

constitutes a "practical," rather than a gratuitous, degree of flexibility
in defining finality, has been a subject of considerable debate.
Part L.A discusses the fundamental policy considerations underlying
the final judgment rule in general, including a desire to increase

judicial efficiency and to avoid adjudicating constitutional questions
unless absolutely necessary. Part I.B provides an overview of the
additional unique concerns supporting the final judgment rule

governing certiorari review of state court decisions by the Supreme
Court, such as federalism and adherence to the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine. Parts I.C and I.D highlight the
Court's early exceptions to the rule, both in the federal and state court

contexts. Finally, Part I.E summarizes the Court's articulation of its
final judgment rule jurisprudence in Cox, where it outlined the four
Cox categories of exception to the rule.

intervening years, Congress had gradually shifted all proceedings from mandatory
review by writ of error to discretionary review by writ of certiorari, and expanded the
availability of review to include all federal questions properly presented to state
courts (rather than only those judgments ruling against the validity of a federal statute
or in favor of the validity of a state statute). Wright, supra,at § 4006. The Act of June
27, eliminated all remaining appeal-as-of-right bases for review by the Court and
made all state court judgments reviewable only by writ of certiorari. Id.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
35. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1291). The section reads, "[a]nd be it further enacted, That final decrees and
judgments in civil actions in a district court . .. may be re-examined and reversed or
affirmed in a circuit court ..... Id.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
37. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
38. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
39. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6. How.) 201, 203 (1848).
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A. The Policy Rationales Underlying the FinalJudgment Rule

1. Judicial Efficiency
The primary purpose of the finality rule, since its inception, has
been to foster judicial efficiency by preventing piecemeal review of
lower court judgments. 4 Reviewing a matter in its entirety, rather
than on successive appeals of interlocutory judgments, avoids
unnecessary delays and preserves the continuity of litigation.4 1 It

lessens the burden on judicial dockets by weeding out cases in which
alleged errors prove to be inconsequential to the outcome of, or are
rendered moot by, subsequent proceedings.4" Avoiding piecemeal
review also improves the quality of judicial decision making by
increasing the likelihood that the Supreme Court will have a complete
record, with all of the relevant facts necessary to make an informed
judgment.4 3

40. See Bait. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178 (1955) ("Congress
has long expressed a policy against piecemeal appeals."); Forgay, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at
205 ("In limiting the right of appeal to final decrees, it was obviously the object of the
law to save the unnecessary expense and delay of repeated appeals in the same suit;
and to have the whole case and every matter in controversy in it decided in a single
appeal."); Canter v. Am. Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307, 318 (1830) (stating that it is "in
furtherance of the manifest intention of the legislature... that causes should not
come up here in fragments, upon successive appeals"); Patrick Edward McGinnis,
Civil Procedure-New Insight on Finality of State Court Judgments, 1975 Ariz. St. L.J.
627, 628 ("The rule was fashioned to preclude the delay and harassment resulting
from incessant appeals from interlocutory orders.").
41. See McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661 (1891). The decision highlights the policy
underlying the final judgment rule:
It is a matter of public history, and is manifest on the face of [the Judiciary
Act], that its primary object was to facilitate the prompt disposition of cases
in the Supreme Court, and to relieve it of the enormous overburden of suits
and cases resulting from the rapid growth of the country and the steady
increase of its litigations.
Id. at 666; see also Theodore D. Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45
Texas L. Rev. 292, 292 (1966) (explaining that the final judgment rule "effectuates ...
an efficient utilization of judicial manpower and permits the initial stage of litigation
to operate in a smooth, orderly fashion without disrupting appeals").
42. See Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of
Interlocutory Orders, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 175, 182-83 (2001); Note, The Finality
Rule for Supreme Court Review of State Court Orders, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1004, 1006
(1978) [hereinafter, The Finality Rule].
43. See Timothy B. Dyk, Supreme Court Review of Interlocutory State-Court
Decisions: "The Twilight Zone of Finality," 19 Stan. L. Rev. 907, 938 (1967)
(explaining that this is a factor even when a full trial was completed and the state
court remanded for a new trial, because the record from the new trial could be
substantially different in several respects); Frank, supra note 41, at 318 (noting that
when the appellate court has only a portion of the record before it, "[t]he opportunity
for a short-sighted decision is manifest"); The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1006
(noting that by awaiting a completed case, the Court can review a federal question
"within the context of a developed factual record and the articulated reasoning and
legal conclusions of the trial judge"); Note, The Requirement of a Final Judgment or
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In the words of Justice Frankfurter, the finality rule "avoids the

mischief of economic waste and of delayed justice" that results from
incessant appeals from interlocutory orders.

4

Justice Story likewise

agreed that it is "of great importance to the due administration of
justice" to prohibit fragmentary review of cases, as successive appeals
would lead to great delays and "oppressive expenses" for the parties.45

The final judgment rule also lends certainty to the judicial process,

making it clear to litigants when appellate review is available. 4 6 An

appeal to the Supreme Court of a state court judgment must be taken
within 90 days of the judgment, or the appellant forfeits the appeal.47
Uncertainty over when an appeal of an unfavorable state court
decision may be filed would burden the Court with appeals filed at

every stage of the litigation by over-cautious litigants who fear losing
their right to appeal by not filing in a timely manner. 48 Lack of clarity
regarding the availability of review also tends to encourage the filing
of interlocutory appeals merely as a dilatory tactic designed to weaken
the opposing side.4 9
Decree for Supreme Court Review of State Courts, 73 Yale L.J. 515, 516 (1964)
[hereinafter Requirement of a FinalJudgment].
44. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945); see also

Waverly Mut. & Permanent Land, Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Buck, 64 Md. 338, 342
(1885) (observing that the final judgment rule "prevent[s] the protraction of litigation
to an indefinite period" by multiple appeals that would "create vexatious delay, and
might eventually result in a ruinous accumulation of costs"); Martin H. Redish, The
PragmaticApproach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 89, 89
(1975).
45. Crick, supra note 32, at 551 (quoting Justice Story in Canter v. Am. Ins. Co.,

28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307, 318 (1830).
46. The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1009.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (2000); Sup. Ct. R. 13; see also McGinnis, supra note 40, at

628.
48. See Wright, supra note 33, at § 4010 (explaining that an expanded finality
doctrine that lacks clarity may result in a denial of appellate justice to a litigant
"whose only fault was a failure to expand imaginatively enough on the now-elusive

finality principle"). Wright adds that "the danger of precluded review [c]ould
encourage many ill-founded protective applications by parties who do not even wish
present review, but who fear that it must be sought now-or-never." Id.; Frank, supra
note 41, at 317 (arguing that vagueness and uncertainty in the final judgment rule
subjects litigants to harassment and the added costs of incessant appeals, as lawyers
unsure of the finality of a decision are forced to appeal from it as a precautionary
measure to insure a timely appeal); Requirement of a Final Judgment, supra note 43,

at 517 (arguing that an expanded definition of finality "will not only permit more
appeals, but will also require them" because, while few litigants would likely be
deprived of review due to a failure to make a timely appeal, "the threat may be
sufficient to burden the courts with premature appeals"). But see McGinnis, supra
note 40, at 640 (arguing that the problem of uncertainty could be resolved by making
appeals from interlocutory state court judgments permissive, rather than mandatory,
so that litigants would not be penalized for failing to make a timely appeal).
49. See Wright, supra note 33, at § 4010 ("Expanded finality doctrines entail ...

apparent risks that the Court will be burdened with applications filed for deliberate
purposes of delay and may at times grant review prematurely."); The Finality Rule,
supra note 42, at 1006; Requirement of a Final Judgment, supra note 43, at 516
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2. Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine
In addition to promoting efficiency in the judicial process, the final
judgment rule effectuates the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, a
doctrine which carries both prudential and constitutional weight. 0
Articulated by Justice Brandeis in his concurrence in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority,5 the doctrine, which reflects principles of
justiciability such as standing, ripeness, and mootness,52 encompasses

several tenets. Among these are the policies that the Court will not
"anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity
of deciding it," and "will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."53 The
Court strives to sustain or reverse a decision on non-constitutional
grounds,

and preferably

on the narrowest grounds

possible. 4

Awaiting the final judgment of a lower court before hearing an appeal
increases the possibility that an appellate court, with a more fullydeveloped record, will be able to decide the case on an issue less

weighty than the constitutional issue that might otherwise be raised in
an interlocutory posture.

(arguing that the danger in an expansive finality rule comes not so much from the
increase in the number of cases on the appellate docket, but from "an ill-defined rule
which, lacking clarity, both lends itself to dilatory appeals and leads prudent counsel
to appeal any order which may appear final"). But see McGinnis, supra note 40, at 644
(arguing that a liberal use of sanctions for frivolous appeals would be a "far more
effective device for relieving congestion than complete denial of interlocutory
appeals").
50. See generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions, 35 B.C.
L. Rev. 1003, 1018-24 (1994) (construing the avoidance doctrine as laid out in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936)).
51. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
52. See Kloppenberg, supra note 50, at 1016-24. The doctrines of mootness,
ripeness, and standing are related to Article III "case or controversy" requirements,
and therefore are of constitutional importance. Id. at 1018.
53. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-47 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 347 (stating that the Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied" (citations
omitted)). The decision further explained that "if a case can be decided on either of
two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter." Id.
55. See Dyk, supra note 43, at 937 (explaining that a significant consideration with
regard to the final judgment rule of § 1257 is that the Supreme Court should decide
constitutional questions only when necessary); Frank, supra note 41 at 319 (noting
that exceptions to the final judgment rule "bring[] into question" the policy of
avoiding unnecessary constitutional issues); The Finality Rule, supra note 42 at 1013
(arguing that the finality rule facilitates the development of alternative grounds for
the disposition of cases, thus enabling the Court to avoid unnecessary constitutional
adjudication).
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B. Unique Concerns Underlying the Finality Rule Governing
CertiorariReview of State Court Judgments by the Supreme Court
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the finality requirement governing
appeals from state courts to the Supreme Court is grounded on even
''more serious concerns" than that governing appeals within the
federal system, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.56 This is demonstrated by the
fact that Congress has enacted many legislative exceptions to § 1291, 57
while conspicuously declining to do so for § 1257.58
1. Federalism and Comity
The final judgment rule of § 1257 is in large part a doctrine of
federalism.5 9 It reflects a concern that excessive federal judicial
interference with state administrative and judicial functions could
have undesirable consequences for our federal system.6"
Maintaining the smooth functioning of our judicial system has been
a primary theme since the beginning of the Republic.6 The Judiciary
56. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 502-03 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
57. For example, § 1292(a) of the Code provides for appeals as of right from
orders granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions. 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a) (2000). Appeal as of right is also permitted, pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, in actions involving more than one claim if the district court judge
directs the entry of a final judgment as to one or more claims "upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
the entry of judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Since 1998, the Federal Rules also
provide for interlocutory appeal of decisions to grant or deny class certification. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(f). Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code permits a district court judge to
certify a question to the court of appeals for interlocutory review if the judge
determines that it is a controlling question of law over which there is a substantial
ground for a difference of opinion, and that the resolution may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Bankruptcy Act
allows for interlocutory appeals in bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541,
§ 24, 30 Stat. 553 (1898). For a complete discussion of appealability in the federal
system, see Glynn, supra note 42.
58. Requirement of a Final Judgment, supra note 43, at 523 ("Amendments or
statutory exceptions to [§1257] have never been attempted, in striking contrast to the
tendency toward statutory liberalization within the federal and state judiciaries.").
59. See McGinnis, supra note 40, at 630 (explaining that an important aspect of
the final judgment rule is "exhaustion of state remedies, based on the doctrines of
comity and federalism"); The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1012 (noting that "the
invocation of section 1257 not only requires attentiveness to the functional concerns
underlying the congressionally mandated principle of finality; it also implicates the
relationship between the states and the federal government, and hence the special
concerns of federalism and comity"); Requirement of a FinalJudgment, supra note 43,
at 530 ("The very fact that the final judgment or decree requirement [of § 1257] has
rested unaltered in the Judicial Code since 1789, while finality requirements have
been varied in other contexts, suggests that finality is partially a doctrine of
federalism, and not solely a rule of convenience.").
60. Cox, 420 U.S. at 503 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Bennett Boskey, Finality of State Court Judgments Under the FederalJudicial
Code, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 1002, 1002 (1943) ("The delicacy of the relationship between

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

Act of 1789 represented a compromise between those who favored a
strong federal court system and those who feared that an independent
federal judiciary would threaten state courts and restrict civil
liberties.62 One of the most controversial provisions of the Act was
section 25, granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear appeals
from decisions of the high courts of the states when those decisions
involved questions of the constitutionality of state or federal laws or
authority.6 3 Early decisions that firmly established the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to review state court decisions did so by
recognizing an "intrinsic interest" in achieving a uniform disposition
of federal questions. 64 Yet principles of federalism and comity require
that federal courts respect the dignity of state courts as those of
another sovereign and avoid creating friction between the two
judiciaries.65
Accordingly, many Justices and scholars have counseled a "more
restrictive approach" with respect to § 1257 than § 1291 finality. 66
Early in the Court's experimentation with exceptions to the finality
rule, Justice Frankfurter warned:
the states and the federal government has from the beginning given emphasis to the
desirability of limiting federal revision of state court judgments to the minimum
consistent with the proper execution of the constitution, statutes and treaties of the
United States.").
62. The Fed. Judicial Ctr., Landmark Judicial Legislation: The Judiciary Act of
1789, at http://air.fjc.gov/history/landmark/02a-bdy.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2004).
63. Id.; see also Hart & Weschler, supra note 33, at 479-80 (documenting strong
resistance by several states to the authority of the Supreme Court to decide cases on
writs of error to state courts, culminating in the doctrines of secession, that each state
had an equal right to stand on its interpretation of the Constitution); Wright, supra
note 33, at § 4006 n.20 (referring to "[t]he frequency and bitterness of... attacks on
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, and the parallel efforts to achieve congressional
limitation of the jurisdiction").
64. Wright, supra note 33, at § 4006.
65. See Frank, supra note 41, at 318 (stating that an overly expansive concept of
finality "involves an intrusion into the state court procedures that is opposed to the
notions of federalism and represents a serious subversion of well-established rules of
Court review which are designed, at least in part, to assist in the maintenance of
harmonious state-federal relations"); The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1012-13
(noting that federalism dictates the need for "a heightened solicitude for the integrity
of the trial process because of possible state sensitivity about interlocutory
supervision by the federal judiciary"). The Court has manifested its understanding of
this need in other ways as well. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-45 (1971)
(articulating the Younger abstention doctrine, by which federal courts are prohibited
from enjoining state court proceedings). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity
Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 28083 (1988) (arguing that, although the principle of comity is often used to justify
circumscribing federal court jurisdiction to reduce friction with state courts, the very
existence of federal courts is an offense to state court judges as it is implicitly based
on a distrust of the state judiciaries).
66. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 503 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Boskey, supra note 61, at 1002-03 (suggesting that the term "final decision" should be
more strictly construed under § 1257 because considerations of federalism dictate
federal restraint in interfering with state judicial actions).
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[The] prerequisite to review derives added force when
the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked to upset the
decision of a State court. Here we are in the realm of
potential conflict between the courts of two different
governments. And so, ever since 1789, Congress has
granted this Court the power to intervene in State
litigation only after "the highest court of a State in
which a decision in the suit could be had" has rendered
a "final judgment or decree." This requirement is not
one of those technicalities to be easily scorned. It is an
important factor in the smooth working of our federal
system. 67
2. Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine

By requiring a final judgment in a case before accepting an appeal
of a decision therein, the Court gives effect to the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine ("State Grounds doctrine"). 68 An

outgrowth of the constitutional avoidance doctrine,69 the State
Grounds doctrine precludes the Supreme Court from reviewing state
court determinations of federal law when there is an independent

state law ground that is adequate to sustain the judgment in the case.7 °
When an order is presented on interlocutory appeal, the state court
has not yet had the opportunity to develop a state law ground upon
67. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945) (citations
omitted); see also Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 67 (1948). In
Republic NaturalGas, the Court stated:
[The] prerequisite [of finality] for the exercise of the appellate powers of this
Court is especially pertinent when a constitutional barrier is asserted against
a State court's decision on matters peculiarly of local concern. Close
observance of this limitation upon the Court is not regard for a strangling
technicality. History bears ample testimony that it is an important factor in
securing harmonious State-federal relations.
Id.
68. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 41, at 319.
69. See Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 572 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that foreclosing the Court from prematurely deciding issues of
constitutional significance "keep[s] to a minimum undesirable federal-state conflicts,"
by providing state courts with the opportunity to render their own judgments on
federal questions, and to potentially resolve disputes on independent state grounds);
Frank, supra note 41, at 319 (noting that the Court, by reviewing an interlocutory
order and circumventing the operation of the State Grounds doctrine, faces a federal,
and often constitutional, issue that might have been avoided); Kloppenberg, supra
note 50, at 1027 (explaining that the State Grounds doctrine is an application of the
"last resort rule," one of the tenets of constitutional avoidance doctrine). For a
general discussion of the avoidance doctrine, see supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
70. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945) (stating that since the time of its
foundation the Supreme Court has refused to review judgments of state courts that
are based on adequate and independent state grounds). See generally Larry W.
Yackle, Federal Courts 177-92 (2d ed. 2003).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

which it may ultimately resolve the matter. 71 By providing a federal
forum prior to the final judgment in the case, the Court inhibits the
state court's ability to exercise its own judicial authority, and considers

constitutional questions "in advance of the necessity of deciding
[them]. 72 While postponing appellate review pending the completion
of state court proceedings and the development of any possible

independent state grounds may result in the insulation of a state
court's mistaken interpretation of federal law from review

altogether,73 comity and a desire to avoid unnecessary adjudication
weigh in favor of exercising this restraint.74
The State Grounds doctrine is widely believed to have a

constitutional dimension as a necessary corollary to the ban on
advisory opinions. 75 The advisory opinion ban is mandated by Article

71. See Frank, supra note 41, at 319.
72. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation omitted); see also Richard Matasar & Gregory S.
Bruch, ProceduralCommon Law, FederalJurisdictionalPolicy, and Abandonment of
the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1291, 135455 n.338 (1986) (explaining that when the Court assumes jurisdiction because its
reversal of the federal issue might avoid further state proceedings and would clarify
federal law, it "cut[s] at the very heart of the adequate and independent state grounds
rule").
73. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 481 (1975) (articulating an
exception to the final judgment rule that enables Supreme Court review of an
interlocutory judgment where subsequent state court proceedings would insulate the
federal question altogether, regardless of the outcome); infra Part I.E.3. Matasar and
Bruch posit that the Court is justified in creating such exceptions to the final
judgment rule to ensure the review of federal questions of law, because doing so
"further[s] the primary mission Congress contemplated for the Court as a vigilant
guardian of federal supremacy and uniformity." Matasar & Bruch, supra note 72, at
1355. The State Grounds doctrine, they assert, should not impose a barrier to the
Court in fulfilling this role by precluding it from reviewing federal issues on appeal
from state courts. Id. at 1314-15. Therefore, the Court should preserve jurisdiction
over federal issues that could otherwise slip from its grasp were it to delay immediate
review of a state court judgment. Id. at 1354-55 nn.338-39.
74. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969). Cardinalestated,
in a federal system it is important that state courts be given the first
opportunity to consider the applicability of state statutes in light of
constitutional challenge, since the statutes may be construed in a way which
saves their constitutionality. Or the issue may be blocked by an adequate
state ground. Even though States are not free to avoid constitutional issues
on inadequate state grounds, they should be given the first opportunity to
consider them.
Id. (citation omitted); Requirement of a FinalJudgment,supra note 43, at 530 (arguing
that increasing the prevalence of review of state court determinations prior to a final
judgment gives the federal system too much "power to effectuate its view of the
law").
75. See Pope v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 345 U.S. 379, 381 (1953) ("Congress has
limited our power... lest the Court's jurisdiction be exercised in piecemeal
proceedings to render advisory opinions."); Herb, 324 U.S. at 125-26 (linking the
origins of the State Grounds doctrine to the ban on advisory opinions by stating that
the Court may not correct a state court's interpretation of federal law unless that
correction would mandate a different outcome in the case, because the Court's review
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III's "case or controversy" requirement, which precludes a federal
court from rendering a decision in a case that lacks a justiciable
question (one that involves a real dispute between truly adverse
litigants which can be redressed by the court).76 The court may not
give a "hypothetical" opinion that does not have a substantial
likelihood of affecting the outcome of the case.77 When litigation may
be resolved on the basis of adequate state law grounds that are
independent of any federal questions, a Supreme Court determination
of the federal issues would amount to an advisory opinion because
there is no actual dispute remaining between adverse litigants, and a
Supreme Court decision resolving the federal issues would not be
likely to have an effect in the case.7"
Imbued as it is with constitutional significance, the State Grounds
doctrine may not be lightly cast aside. Yet, as the doctrine is premised
on avoidance of federal review, it is necessarily at odds with the policy
considerations that underlie the exceptions to the final judgment
rule.79 This conflict has posed a significant dilemma to the Court as it
has considered the compelling interests that often counsel in favor of

would otherwise amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion); Cynthia L.
Fountaine, Article III and the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48
Am. U. L. Rev. 1053, 1055 (1999) ("[T~he Constitution dictates the boundaries of the
State Grounds Doctrine."); Richard W. Westling, Comment, Advisory Opinions and
the "Constitutionally Required" Adequate Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 63
Tul. L. Rev. 379, 390-403 (1988) (arguing that the State Grounds doctrine is an
application of the advisory opinion ban, which is itself constitutionally grounded in
Article III). But see Martin H. Redish, Federal Courts: Cases, Comments and
Questions 932 (4th ed. 1998) (pointing out that the advisory opinion rationale for the
State Grounds doctrine "has been criticized by commentators").
76. See 22 James Win. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 406.03[1] (3d. ed.
2004) (explaining that the restriction prevents the Court from encroaching on the
legislative branch of government by rendering an opinion intended to affect the law
on an abstract level); Kloppenberg, supra note 50, at 1010-11. But see Matasar &
Bruch, supra note 72, at 1390 (characterizing the State Grounds doctrine as federal
common law that was "developed from erroneous constitutional jurisprudence,
misconstructions of federal statutes, and historical happenstance").
77. See Kloppenberg, supra note 50, at 1011; Westling, supra note 75, at 397
("When a complete resolution of the parties' rights can take place without addressing
the federal question presented and when the resolution of the federal question cannot
effect the final disposition of the parties' claims, an answer to the federal question
would be hypothetical."). The ban on advisory opinions was first articulated in
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), which declared that it would be a
violation of the separation of powers principle for Supreme Court Justices to
recommend to the Secretary of War what amount of benefits should be paid to a
veteran if the Secretary could refuse to follow the Court's recommendation.
Kloppenberg, supra note 50, at 1011 n.42.
78. See Fountaine, supra note 75, at 1077. For example, in cases where the
petitioner would have prevailed on state law grounds, a Supreme Court reversal of
The outcome-the
the state court on the federal issue becomes irrelevant.
petitioner's victory-is the same either way.
79. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 72, at 1294, 1351-54.
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making such exceptions, and has attempted to strike the proper

balance.
C. Development of the TraditionalExceptions to the FinalJudgment
Rule: Arguments Against Rigid Adherence
For many years the Court subscribed to a rigid approach, insisting

on a narrow definition of finality that made the "face of the
judgment" determinative of the right to review.80 Only when the
judgment on appeal concluded the entire litigation, save for formal
entry of the judgment, was it deemed final.8 '
The Court soon acknowledged, however, that practical concerns

often counsel against strict application of the rule. In response, the
Court began interpreting the rule to allow appeals of realistically final
orders that effectively sounded the "death knell" of the litigation,
even though technical finality has not been established.8 2 The Court's

next step was to carve out a true exception to the final judgment rule
with the collateral order doctrine, first articulated in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.83 Under the doctrine, the Court may
review decisions that are clearly interlocutory, but which are
conclusive of the sole federal issue in a case, when that issue is

separate from the merits of the suit and when review at a later date
The Court therefore seeks to
may be difficult or impossible.'
immediately correct a highly prejudicial error that could cause the
petitioner irreparable harm. 5 In such cases, the Court has determined
that "the danger of denying justice by delay" outweighs the
"inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review."86
80. See, e.g., La. Navigation Co. v. Oyster Comm'n of La., 226 U.S. 99 (1912)
(holding that the test of finality is the face of the judgment, because the Court cannot
be called upon to review an action of a state court in piecemeal fashion); Haseltine v.
Cent. Bank, 183 U.S. 130, 131 (1901) (announcing that the Court has "always made
the face of the judgment the test of its finality").
81. See Dyk, supra note 43, at 910.
82. Wright, supra note 33, at § 4010 (describing "practical finality cases" as
including those in which the federal question presented on appeal has been finally
decided by the highest state court available to consider it); Redish, supra note 44, at
92.
83. 337 U.S. 541 (1949); see also Redish, supra note 44, at 94 (noting that the
Cohen Court enunciated the collateral order doctrine).
84. See Redish, supra note 44, at 94.
85. See Wright, supra note 33, at § 4010 (noting that cases in which an
interlocutory judgment was held final "have presented varying mixtures of elements
that may be labeled as severability and hardship"); Glynn, supra note 42, at 183
(explaining that in some cases, "erroneous decisions prior to the entry of final
judgment may, as a practical matter, inflict harm that is irreparable or incurable after
final judgment"); The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1007 (explaining that permitting
interlocutory review is particularly important when the "harm flowing from the error
[of the state court] may not be susceptible to later repair").
86. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964) (internal quotation
omitted) (holding that a court of appeals was correct in reviewing a federal district
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For example, the Court has agreed to review a lower court decree
for the immediate transfer of land, even though an accounting of rents
and profits remained to be completed.87 The Court reasoned that the
accounting was collateral to the merits of the case, and that if review
were delayed pending its completion, the petitioner could suffer
irreparable harm.8 8 The Court has also held that an order improperly
relieving the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative action of the
requirement to post bond, thereby depriving the defendant of
procedural protection against "strike suits," was not remediable at a
later time in the litigation.89 In cases in which a state court has issued
a temporary injunction preventing the exercise of free speech, the
Court has determined that this may effectively extinguish altogether
the First Amendment rights the petitioner seeks to protect, as where
the injunction is in place for many years, 9° or prematurely ends a labor
dispute by preventing union picketing. 91 In short, the Court has long
court's judgment, although further proceedings remained at the trial level, because
interlocutory review would not in any way increase the inconvenience and cost of
trying the case, and because a delay of perhaps several years in having the petitioner's
rights determined might work a great injustice).
87. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 205 (1848). The decision is
commonly thought to have originated the "irreparable harm" exception. See Dyk,
supra note 43, at 915; Requirement of a FinalJudgment, supra note 43, at 521.
88. Forgay, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 205. In Forgay, a federal circuit court issued a
decree declaring certain deeds void, and directing money and property to be delivered
to the plaintiff upon an accounting by the master. Id. at 202-03. Despite the
ministerial duty of carrying out the decree that remained to be done, which rendered
the judgment not final "in the strict, technical sense of that term," the Supreme Court
determined that the judgment effectively settled the case. Id. at 203. Because the
bankruptcy assignee planned to seize the property and immediately distribute the
proceeds to the bankrupt's creditors, if review were delayed until after the accounts
had been adjusted by the master the appellant would be "subjected to irreparable
injury." Id. at 204; see also Carondelet Canal & Navigation Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S.
362 (1914) (order directing transfer of property back to the state would not have been
remediable if reviewed at a later date, as sovereign immunity would have barred
recovery of the property from the state).
89. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Cohen, the
decision that established the collateral order doctrine, involved a shareholder
derivative action in which a district court denied the defendant corporation's motion
to require the plaintiff to post security to pay for defense costs in the event the
plaintiff lost, as required by state statute. Id. at 544-45. Although the denial did not
terminate the litigation, the Supreme Court found that the district court's decision
was final as to the question of security. Id. at 546-47. The Court held that the
judgment "finally determine[d] claims of right separable from, and collateral to rights
asserted in the action," and that those claims were "too important to be denied review
and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id. at 546. After a final judgment on the
merits, it would have been "too late effectively to review the present order, [as] the
rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably
irreparably." Id.
90. See, e.g., Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). For a
discussion of the case, see infra note 187.
91. See, e.g., Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen'l Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S.
542 (1963). For a discussion of the case, see infra Part II.A.
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recognized that the "right of appeal is of very little value to [the
petitioner if] he may be ruined before he is permitted to avail himself
of the right."92
D. Application of the Exceptions to Appeals from State Courts
The collateral order/irreparable harm exception was developed in
cases involving appeals within the federal system.93 The Court
acknowledged early on that its willingness to forego a strict reading of
the final judgment rule in favor of countervailing policy concerns
stemmed from a recognition that the legislature itself contemplated a
balancing approach for appeals within the federal system.94 It was
therefore with great reluctance that the Court initially began applying
the exceptions in the context of appeals from state courts.
In Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, for example, the Court
granted review of a state court judgment that finally disposed of a
federal right and remanded for an accounting of profits before
property changed hands.95 The Court asserted jurisdiction despite its
acknowledgment that a conventional interpretation of "final
judgment" would preclude reviewability "where anything further
remains to be determined by a State court, no matter how dissociated
from the only federal issue that has finally been adjudicated by the
highest court of the State."96
Justice Frankfurter conceded that most of the cases on which he
relied involved appeals within the federal system.97 While
admonishing that the "requirement [of finality] is not one of those
technicalities to be easily scorned," as it is a critical element in the
smooth working of our federal system, Frankfurter recognized that a
92. Forgay, 47 U.S. at 205. Over time, the Court has significantly expanded its
conception of what constitutes irreparable harm in order to justify ever-broader
exceptions to the final judgment rule. See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
93. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 541; Forgay,47 U.S. at 201.
94. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545 (noting that, as a threshold matter, its willingness
to grant review was based on the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 1292 indicates a congressional
"purpose to allow appeals from orders other than final judgments when they have a
final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties"); supra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text.
95. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945). Radio Station
WOW involved a judgment by the Supreme Court of Nebraska directing that a lease
and license to operate a radio station was to be set aside for fraud and that the
original position of the parties was to be restored. Id. at 121-22. The state court
rejected petitioner's argument that the Federal Communications Commission had
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Id. at 123. All that remained
to be done at the trial level was an accounting of the station's operations. Id. at 127.
The Court concluded that the requirement of finality had been satisfied in prior cases
by judgments with characteristics very similar to those presented by the Nebraska
decree. Id. at 125-26 (citing Carondelet Canal & Navigation Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S.
362 (1914) and Forgay,47 U.S.(6 How.) at 201).
96. Radio Station WOW, 326 U.S. at 124.
97. Id. at 126 n.2.
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"penumbral area" inevitably surrounds the otherwise rigid concept.98
He was careful to erect boundaries around that area, allowing it to
encompass only situations where there had been a "conclusive
adjudication" of rights and liabilities, with an order for immediate
delivery of possession of the subject matter of the suit. 99
Over time, however, the Court appeared to grow increasingly
comfortable with expanding the penumbral area around § 1257. It
confined its discussion of Frankfurter's concerns to ever-smaller
portions of its opinions, l°0 and cited cases construing §§ 1291 and 1257
interchangeably, obscuring the important differences between them.10 '
With a pair of cases decided on the same day in 1963, the Court
finally closed the gap that had existed between the availability of
Supreme Court review of state court decisions, and review within the
federal system."° In Local No. 438 Construction& General Laborers'
Union v. Curry °3 and Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau'° the
Court applied and expanded upon the principles enunciated in Cohen,

significantly broadening its conception of the types of orders that may
be considered collateral to the merits, as well as of what constitutes
irreparable harm sufficient to warrant immediate appellate
intervention." Subsequent decisions would reflect this expansion. 1°6
98. Id. at 124.
99. Id. at 126. Such a judgment is "independent of, and unaffected by," a
provision for accounting, even if it is part of the same decree. Id. Further, if
appellants had to wait for the completion of the accounting, they would be subjected
to irremediable injury. Id. The Court never made clear why a judgment directing
immediate delivery of physical property would necessarily cause irremediable injury if
immediate review were to be denied. In fact, three years later, the Court came to the
opposite conclusion. See Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 70
(1948) (holding that "[m]erely because a party to a litigation may be temporarily out
of pocket, is not sufficient to warrant immediate review of an incomplete [s]tate
judgment," as there is no reason to assume the petitioner's loss would not be
recoverable).
100. See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
101. See Frank, supra note 41, at 295 (observing that, by the mid-twentieth century,
cases "demonstrated no added rigidity in defining section 1257 finality, and cases
decided under sections 1291 and 1257 [were increasingly] cited interchangeably as
authority for each other"); Requirement of a Final Judgment, supra note 43, at 524
(noting that the Court has used principles from Forgay and Cohen, two cases decided
in the federal system, in resolving questions of reviewability of state court decisions
"without apparent recognition that such a use could be considered an extension of
doctrine"); see also Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen'l Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S.
542, 549 (1963) (citing Cohen as authority for granting an exception to § 1257 under
otherwise similar factual circumstances).
102. Requirement of a FinalJudgment, supra note 43, at 524.
103. 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
104. 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
105. See Dyk, supra note 43, at 920 (observing that with Curry and Langdeau, the
Court "seemingly reversed itself" on the traditional distinctions it had drawn between
final and non-final judgments); Requirement of a Final Judgment, supra note 43, at
526 (observing that the Curry-Langdeaurule had "a wide sweep"); infra Part II.A.
106. See infra notes 187-90, 252-55 and accompanying text.

808

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

E. The Four Cox Categories
From the "deceptively simple" language of § 1257 limiting Supreme
Court review to "final judgment or decrees," the Court had "spun a
complicated web" indeed."°7 The Court itself acknowledged the
confusion its decisions had created, conceding that it found it
"impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming
within what might well be called the 'twilight zone' of finality."'0 8 The
Court seized an opportunity to clarify and institutionalize its finality
doctrine in Cox, 19 in which it articulated four categories of exception
to § 1257.
1. Cox One: Practical Finality
The so-called "first Cox category" includes cases in which, although
further state-court proceedings-even entire trials-remain, the
federal question has been finally decided and is likely to be decisive in
the outcome of the litigation."'
For example, in Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,"' the
appellant sought review of a Georgia Supreme Court decision which
rejected his claim that the Federal Employers' Liability Act
("FELA") allowed him to sue his employer in another state, and
remanded to the trial court to grant the employer's motion for
injunctive relief."2 As the appellant conceded that his case rested
entirely upon this federal claim, all that remained to be done on
remand to the trial court was "the mechanical entry of judgment.""' 3
Sending the case back to the state courts would be a waste of judicial
resources because no other federal issues would arise that would
create a situation of piecemeal review, and there were no independent
and adequate state grounds on which the petitioner might prevail,
mooting the federal issue." 4 The Supreme Court would therefore
ultimately be faced with the very same issue on appeal at a later
date." 5
More than a decade later, the Court applied this reasoning in Mills
v. Alabama,"6 another case classified in Cox as falling into the first

107. Hart & Weschler, supra note 33, at 594.
108. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964).
109. 420 U.S. 469 (1974).
110. Id. at 479.
111. 345 U.S. 379 (1953).
112. Id. at 381.
113. Id. at 382.
114. Id.
115. The Court explained that, while judgments such as an overruling of a
demurrer or the granting of a temporary injunction are ordinarily not reviewable, the
federal question in this case is "ripe for adjudication when tested against the policy of
§ 1257." Id.
116. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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category of exceptions to § 1257.117 The editor of a newspaper in
Alabama had been arrested for violating a state statute prohibiting
the publication on election day of any editorial for or against any
proposition or candidate involved in the election." 8 The Alabama
Supreme Court held that the statute was not an unconstitutional
abridgement of freedom of speech and press as guaranteed by the
First Amendment, and remanded for further proceedings.11 9 Noting
that the state court had rendered a binding judgment ordering the trial
court to convict the petitioner under the state statute if it found that
he wrote the editorial, and that the petitioner conceded he did write it,
the Supreme Court explained that a trial would inevitably end with a
conviction, and the case would "then once more wind its weary way
back to us as a judgment unquestionably final and appealable."' 12 0
Unwilling to cause both an "inexcusable delay of the benefits

Congress intended to grant by providing for appeal to this Court," as
well as a "completely unnecessary waste of time and energy in judicial
systems already troubled by delays due to congested dockets," the
Court held the judgment to be final. 2 '
This exception to the final judgment rule for "practical finality" has
been fairly uncontroversial, 2 2 as it furthers goals of judicial efficiency
without circumventing the policies of federalism and comity12 3 The
exception waves the "formal indicia of finality," saving both the
judicial system and the petitioner the burden of awaiting final
judgment and then once again bringing an appeal.124 There is clearly
no risk of piecemeal review because there is no possibility that other
federal issues will be raised in subsequent state court proceedings.
117. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 479 n.8 (1975). In addition to Pope
and Mills, the Cox decision cited Organizationfor a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415 (1971) and Local No. 438 Construction & General Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371
U.S. 542 (1963) as cases within the first category.
118. Mills, 384 U.S. at 215-17.
119. Id. at 216.
120. Id. at 217.
121. Id. at 217-18.
122. See The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1016 (explaining that cases in which
"practical finality" has been achieved at the time of appeal constitute "the least
problematic category under finality doctrine because the departure [from finality] is
merely technical"). See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) (state court held
an amendment to a congressional act regarding admission of evidence to be invalid,
leaving nothing to be determined on remand but the amount of attorney's fees to
which respondents were entitled); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299
(1989) (state court finally adjudicated the constitutionality of a state act that provided
specific rules regarding electric utility rate increases, leaving the outcome of further
proceedings preordained).
123. See supra Part I.B.1.
124. The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1016.
125. Id. Yet the exception has not gone completely uncriticized. In Mills, Justice
Harlan issued a separate opinion in which he questioned whether the outcome of the
state proceedings really was preordained, noting that it is possible that a jury could
disregard the judge's instructions and acquit. Mills, 384 U.S. at 222 (Harlan, J.,
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2. Cox Two: The Collateral Order Doctrine

The second Cox category is essentially an embodiment of the
collateral order doctrine, comprising cases in which the federal issue
has been finally decided and will survive regardless of the outcome of
There is no possibility that future
subsequent proceedings. 126
proceedings will give rise to additional federal questions, which would
present a problem of piecemeal review, nor will future proceedings
12 7

foreclose or make unnecessary decisions on the federal question.

Cases in this category, including Radio Station WOW, Inc. v.
12 9
Johnson12 and Carondelet Canal & Navigation Co. v. Louisiana,
also arguably involve the likelihood 13that
delayed review could result
0
in irreparable harm to the petitioner.

This exception has created little controversy, as13it fosters efficiency
without sacrificing the benefits of the finality rule. '
3. Cox Three: Federal Issue Insulation
In the third category are cases in which the federal claim has been
finally decided and subsequent state court proceedings will insulate
the federal issue from later review, regardless of the outcome.132 If the
separate opinion). If that were to occur, the Court's adjudication of the constitutional
issue would have been premature. Id. Harlan also urged that, regardless of what were
to happen at trial, the limitations on the Court's jurisdiction contained in § 1257
"should be respected and not turned on and off at the pleasure of its members or to
suit the convenience of litigants." Id. at 223 (citation omitted). Others have also
suggested that it is possible that a petitioner, after stipulating to certain issues to have
his appeal heard, could change his mind. See The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 101617. The Court cannot possibly be expected to examine, in every case, whether the
petitioner might be able to raise other claims in further proceedings. Id. One
proposed solution to this problem is to predicate interlocutory appeal under this
category upon the petitioner's renunciation of any additional claims and defenses. Id.
126. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 480 (1975). However, in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., it was not certain that the federal issue would have
survived, rather than been mooted by, subsequent proceedings. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
See also Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral OrderDoctrine: A New "Serbonian Bog"
and Four Proposalsfor Reform, 46 Drake L. Rev. 539, 545 (1998) (explaining that,
had the petitioner/corporation ultimately prevailed on the merits of the shareholder
suit, the trial court's judgment to deny him security would have become moot).
127. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 480.
128. 326 U.S. 120 (1945); see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
129. 233 U.S. 362 (1914).
130. See Hart & Weschler, supra note 33, at 595.
131. See The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1017-20 (describing the second
category as "theoretically proper" because the only federal issues have been
determined by the highest possible court, precluding the possibility of piecemeal
review, the federal question will definitely not be mooted by subsequent proceedings,
and there is no danger of evading the independent and adequate state grounds
doctrine). However, the difficulty in determining with certainty whether the federal
question would in fact survive further state court proceedings could lead to excessive
appeals by cautious litigants. Id. at 1019.
132. Cox, 420 U.S. at 481.
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party seeking review were to prevail in court on state law grounds, the
federal issue would be mooted, while if the party were to lose on the
merits, the law of the state would preclude an appeal.'3 3
This exception typically applies in criminal cases where double
Cox cited35
jeopardy prevents the state from appealing an acquittal.3
North DakotaState Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. 1
as the rare civil example of this situation.'3 6 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held that a state statute pursuant to which the
petitioner Board had denied the respondent pharmacy an operating
permit was unconstitutional. 3 7 The court remanded the case so that
the Board could conduct a hearing to consider the pharmacy's
application for a permit pursuant instead to the state's Administrative
Agencies Practice Act.'38 Showing its apparent discomfort with its
decision to review the state court judgment, the Supreme Court was
painstaking in its review of precedent and its consideration of the
purposes of the finality rule-namely, avoiding piecemeal review and
advisory opinions, and "limit[ing] review of state court determinations
of federal constitutional issues to [minimize] federal intrusion into

state affairs."' 39 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the case fit
within the penumbral area of § 1257 that Justice Frankfurter

133. Id.
134. For example, the Cox Court cited California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
which held that a state court's reversal of a conviction on federal constitutional
grounds and remand for new trial was a final decision. Cox, 420 U.S. at 481. If the
state, the party seeking review, prevailed at trial, the federal issue would be mooted,
whereas if the state lost at trial, state law would have prohibited the government's
appeal of defendant's conviction. Id.; see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769
(2001) (noting that if the state (the petitioner) were to obtain a conviction at trial, its
claim that certain evidence was wrongfully suppressed would be moot, while if the
respondent was acquitted, the state would be precluded from pressing its federal
claim again on appeal); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (holding as final a
state court judgment deciding that the withholding of certain evidence was a violation
of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and remanding for determination of whether
a new trial was necessary, because the federal issue would be unreviewable regardless
of outcome of proceedings on remand). The Court in Ritchie explained that if the
trial court were to find the withholding of evidence to be non-prejudicial, or if it were
to order a new trial and the defendant was again convicted, the state would have
prevailed and would have no need to appeal. Id. at 48. If the defendant were
acquitted in a new trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar the state from
appealing. Id. Justice Stevens, however, pointed out that a different scenario was
possible: the state could immediately appeal an order for a new trial. Id. at 74
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Since this was a possibility, Stevens argued, the federal issue
would not necessarily be mooted and the third Cox exception should not apply. Id.
135. 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
136. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 481-82.
137. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. at 157-58. The statute required that that the
applicant for a permit to operate a pharmacy be a "registered pharmacist in good
standing," or a "corporation or association whose majority stock is owned by
registered pharmacists in good standing." Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 159.
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identified in Radio Station WOW, 4 ' stating two reasons. First, there
was no risk that the subsequent state court litigation would raise other
federal questions that may later come up to the Court, leading to
fragmentary review.14 Second, whatever the outcome of the dispute,
the constitutional question would be lost. 142 If the Licensing Board
were to determine in its adjudication that the administrative statute
required it to grant the license to the pharmacy, the Board would not
be permitted to appeal this decision, as a matter of state procedural
law.'43 If, on the other hand, the Board were to find that the pharmacy
did not meet the necessary safety standards required under the
statute, it would deny the license and have no need to seek Supreme
Court review on the federal question.'"
The third Cox exception clearly does not rest on a desire to prevent
irreparable harm to the petitioner; it was just as likely that the
petitioner Board would prevail as it was that it would lose.'4 5 Nor does
the exception achieve efficiency benefits by expediting review that
would inevitably occur at a later time; it was quite possible that the
matter would be resolved on independent state grounds, removing
any need for the Court to consider the federal issue. The Court's
primary concern was instead to preserve its review of the
constitutionality of the stock-ownership statute, even at the cost of
circumventing entirely the state grounds doctrine.'46 This exception,
therefore, represented a considerable expansion of the finality
doctrine.'47
Accordingly, the exception has been challenged in some cases.
Justice Stevens has derided it as being "wholly contrary to our long
tradition of avoiding, not reaching out to decide, constitutional
decisions when a case may be disposed of on other grounds.""'
Stevens has also criticized the Court for what he has deemed to be an
inconsistent application of the exception.'49 Yet others have accepted
140. Id. at 160 (citing Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124
(1945)).
141. Id. at 163.
142. Id. at 162 ("[W]e have discovered no way which the licensing authority in
North Dakota has of preserving the constitutional question now ripe for decision.").
143. Id. at 163-64. If the Board granted the license in accordance with the state
supreme court determination that the statute permitting a denial was
unconstitutional, and then sought to appeal its own grant on the grounds that the state
statute is in fact valid, the appeal would likely be dismissed on the independent state
ground that North Dakota procedural law does not provide the agency the right to
appeal. Id.
144. Id. at 163.
145. Even if irreparable harm to the petitioner was a factor in the Court's decision
to grant review of the state court's decision, it is far from clear that this exception was
intended to benefit government entities or, by extension, the public interest.
146. See The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1021-23.
147. Id.
148. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 75 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Jefferson v. Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 84 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
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the rationale of preserving a constitutional question as a viable one. 5 '
Alternatively, as one commentator has theorized, the Court's action in
reviewing an interlocutory order in this posture may be seen less as an
attempt to prevent the development of independent, substantive state
law grounds, and more as a reluctance to allow merely procedural
state law to serve as a barrier to review of federal issues. 151
troublesome as its scope is
Regardless, the exception is not terribly
152
finite and its boundaries are clear.
4. The Fourth Cox Category: Erosion of Federal Policy
Lastly, the Court will treat as final a decision in which the party
seeking review might prevail on nonfederal grounds in subsequent
state court proceedings, rendering Supreme Court review
unnecessary, but where a reversal of the state court on the federal
issue would be preclusive of any further litigation.153 In such
situations, "if a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision
might seriously erode federal policy," the Court will entertain the
case.1 4 Cox itself fell into this category.
It is the application of the fourth Cox exception with which the
remainder of this Note is concerned. It has become the most
controversial of the four, as evidenced by the battle of opinions in
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky. 55 Part II traces how the exception evolved from
the Court's earlier decisions. It then examines how it has been
applied, discussing the benefits the Court has emphasized -primarily,
preventing erroneous state court judgments from eroding important
federal policies. Part II then outlines the primary criticisms of the
doctrine -namely, that the exception is formless, encouraging
incessant appeals and allowing the Court to circumvent traditional
constraints on its jurisdiction.

Court for reaching a different decision in Jefferson than in Ritchie, even though the
facts of the cases are similar).
150. See Yackle, supra note 70, at 168.
151. The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1022 (explaining that the "Court need not
observe state procedural law as scrupulously as it must state substantive grounds,"
and that the third exception is therefore palatable).
152. See Jefferson, 522 U.S. at 83 (declining to apply the third Cox exception,
distinguishing Ritchie as being an "extraordinary case" that presented an "unusual"
situation that should be "confine[d] to the precise circumstances the Court there
confronted").
153. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975).
154. Id. at 483.
155. 539 U.S. 654 (2003); see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
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II. REDEFINING FINALITY: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF
THE FOURTH

COX EXCEPTION TO THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE

The Court's articulation and application in Cox of the fourth
exception to the final judgment rule was foreshadowed by its
increasingly irreverent approach to finality in preceding cases. The
careful balancing of competing interests that had characterized earlier
opinions'56 had given way to a more cursory consideration of the final
judgment rule's underlying policies. Dissenting Justices and legal
scholars were outspoken in their criticism along the way.
Part II.A traces this trend toward greater flexibility, beginning with
two important cases in which the Court markedly altered its treatment
of the final judgment rule and greatly expanded the realm of state
court judgments that it was willing to consider reviewable. Part II.B
discusses Miami Herald and Cox-the two cases in which the Court
developed its most controversial exception to the rule-and outlines
arguments of how this doctrine plainly undermined the spirit of the
final judgment rule and its carefully constrained traditional
exceptions. Finally, Part II.C reviews post-Cox case law, which has
reflected general inconsistency and confusion in applying the new
doctrine.
A. Shifting the Balance: Favoring GreaterFlexibility
Two important cases exemplified this trend. In Local No. 438
Construction & General Laborers' Union v. Curry,'5 7 the Georgia
Supreme Court had granted to a construction company temporary
injunctive relief against workers picketing in violation of a state
statute.15 8 The union appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing
that its activities were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). 5 9 The Court held that the state
court's decision that it had jurisdiction to issue the injunction was final
under § 1257, despite the fact that the case would continue in the
lower courts. 160
Several reasons supported this conclusion. First, the judgment
finally determined claims of right that were separable from, and
collateral to, other rights asserted in the action, making it unnecessary
61
to defer consideration until the entire case was adjudicated.
156. See, e.g., Pope v. At. Coast Line R.R., 345 U.S. 379 (1953); Montgomery Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178 (1952); Radio
Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945).
157. 371 U.S. 542 (1963); see supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
158. Curry, 371 U.S. at 545.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 549-50.
161. Id. (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
The Court failed to address the fact that Curry involved the judgment of a state court
and thus implicated § 1257, while Cohen was governed by § 1291, which does not
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Second, the Court was concerned that the issuance of a temporary
injunction would "render entirely illusory" the petitioner's right to

Supreme Court review or to a hearing before the NLRB. 6 2 Third, the
Court could not allow § 1257, although

it counseled against

fragmenting and prolonging litigation, to serve as a barrier to granting
an appeal "when postponing review would seriously erode the
national labor policy requiring the subject matter of respondents'
'
cause to be heard by the NLRB, not by the state courts."163
In concurrence, Justice Harlan exhorted that denials of

jurisdictional challenges had never been considered final judgments

before."6 The opinion, he said, "strain[ed] ... precedents to the
'
breaking point."165

present the same kinds of federalism concerns as its counterpart. See Cohen, 337 U.S.
at 545-46.
162. Curry, 371 U.S. at 550. If several years were interposed between the issuance
of the temporary injunction and the eventual resolution of the matter, a vindication of
the union's right to picket would be essentially meaningless. Id. While the issuance of
a temporary injunction is ordinarily not reviewable because of its interlocutory
posture, see Pope v. Ati. Coast Line R.R., 345 U.S. 379, 381 (1953), the Court
emphasized that the judgment being appealed was not the order of injunction, but
rather the state court's assertion of jurisdiction. Curry, 371 U.S. at 548. As the
Georgia court had finally determined its jurisdiction in a ruling that was collateral to
the merits of the case and not subject to later alteration, the Court determined it was
a final judgment. Id. at 549-50.
163. Curry, 371 U.S. at 550.
164. Id. at 553-54 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan denied that any of the Court's
precedents "could be interpreted to suggest that a state court's determination as to
state versus federal jurisdiction could, without more, be considered a final judgment
subject to ... review when further proceedings on the merits were still pending." Id.
at 553. He did not seem troubled by the fact that the jurisdictional ruling was coupled
with the issuance of a temporary injunction against picketing during a labor dispute, a
restraint that could effectively break the strike and moot the union's case by the time
a final judgment was rendered. Id. at 536. For authority, Harlan cited Montgomery
Building & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178
(1952), a case presenting nearly identical facts as Curry, yet reaching the opposite
conclusion. The Court in Montgomery refused to review an order of temporary
injunction against labor picketers, even though the petitioner challenged the state
court's assertion of jurisdiction. Id. at 180-81. From its earliest days, the Court
explained, it has refused to review interlocutory decrees such as preliminary
injunctions. Id. at 181. The Court was not swayed by the fact that a temporary
injunction in a labor dispute may have the same effect as a permanent injunction, and
that to await the outcome of the final hearing would be "to moot the question and to
frustrate the picketing." Id. While the argument was "appealing," the Court was
emphatic that only Congress can enlarge the Court's jurisdiction. Id. Note that in
Montgomery, the majority framed the question on appeal as being the propriety of
the state court's issuance of an injunction. In Curry, eleven years later, the Court
framed the question as being whether the state possessed the power to issue an
injunction of this kind in a labor dispute, or whether that power is reserved to the
NLRB. Curry, 371 U.S. at 549-50. It was presumably easier to conclude that a
jurisdictional decision is a final determination that is wholly separable from the merits
of the underlying litigation, than to argue the same regarding an order of injunction.
165. Curry, 371 U.S. at 554 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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As if acknowledging this, the majority provided an entirely
independent reason for sustaining jurisdiction. 6 6 The petitioner in
Curry had conceded that it had no factual or legal issues to present in
court beyond its claim that federal law bars the court's authority to
to those presented in
adjudicate the matter 167 -circumstances 1similar
68
Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.
In Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau,169 the companion case to
Curry, the Texas Supreme Court had ruled that a state statute

permitting a plaintiff to sue two national banks in a particular venue
was not preempted by a federal statute that would have enabled the
banks to transfer the action to another county.170 The U.S. Supreme
Court provided only a very brief justification for its decision to grant

review of the state court judgment, concluding simply that the case
was "quite similar" to Curry and deferring to the more lengthy
discussion in that case.'71

In both cases, the petitioner claimed that a federal rather than a
state statute governed the court in which proceedings could take
73
place 17 2 - an issue that is separate and independent from the merits.
The Court concluded in Langdeau that it would serve the policy

underlying the final judgment rule of § 1257 to resolve the venue
question immediately "rather than to subject [the parties] to long and
complex litigation which may all be for naught if consideration of the

preliminary question
of venue is postponed until the conclusion of the
1 74
proceedings.'
In his dissent in Langdeau, Justice Harlan echoed the concerns he

voiced in Curry, arguing that a determination that venue was properly
laid in a particular county is "tantamount to a denial of a motion to
dismiss, [and] is a classic example of an interlocutory ruling that is

166. Id. at 550.

167. Id.
168. 345 U.S. 379 (1953); see supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
169. 371 U.S. 555 (1963); see supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
170. Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 558.
171. Id. at 557-58. While the Court was quite confident in proclaiming Curry and
Langdeau to be susceptible to the same analysis, there was one key difference that
rendered the latter a more unsettling decision. As Justice Harlan highlighted in his
dissent, Langdeau, unlike Curry, was not a case in which "the appellant's whole case
must stand or fall on the federal claim." Id. at 573 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The
petitioner in Curry had no arguments to press based on state law, which meant the
federal issue would inevitably come up for review at some later time. Curry, 371 U.S.
at 550-51. Yet it was possible in Langdeau for the petitioner to prevail on
independent and adequate state grounds, which would have made consideration of
the federal issue unnecessary. Langdeau,371 U.S. at 573-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
172. In Curry the question pertained to the jurisdiction of any and all state courts,
while in Langdeau, the issue was only which state court has proper venue.
173. See Wright, supra note 33, at § 4010; Frank, supra note 41, at 309.
174. Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 558.
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only a step towards ultimate disposition and is not in itself reviewable
as a final judgment."' 75
Curry and Langdeau demonstrated that a clear shift in the Court's
finality jurisprudence had taken place.17 6 In determining whether to
make an exception to the final judgment rule, the Court had always
weighed the policy rationales underlying the rule against interests in
efficiency and in protecting the petitioner from irreparable loss of an
important right. Yet with Curry and Langdeau, the Court broadened
its notion of what constitutes an "important" right and what amounts
to "irreparable harm."' 7 7 As one scholar opined, the requirement that
a claim be "important" now seemed to encompass any right conferred
by statute or by the Constitution, and the "threat of injury" to that
right that is required for the Court to intervene seemed to be
minimal.'78 In addition, Curry and Langdeau introduced a new factor
into the balance-the risk that a standing state court judgment might
erode federal policy.179 The federal policy in Curry was one providing
0
for the NLRB to have exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes.8 In
Langdeau, it was a policy providing special venue rules for cases
against national banks-although the Court in Langdeau did not
actually purport to act out of concern for preserving this policy.' 8 ' In

175. Id. at 572 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
176. See id. ("The Court's opinion in these appeals, and some of the things said in
[Curry], cut deeply into the statutory requirement of 'finality' limiting our jurisdiction
to review state court judgments.").
177. Both cases suggested that the right to be free from unnecessary proceedings
was an important right in and of itself, and that being forced to litigate in an improper
forum constituted sufficiently irreparable harm-even though review in the proper
forum would still ultimately be available. See Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 558 (suggesting
that neither petitioner nor respondent should be subject to "long and complex
litigation which may all be for naught"); Curry, 371 U.S. at 548 (noting that, without
immediate review, petitioner would remain subject to proceedings which the state

courts have no power to conduct). If one accepts the notion that a litigant has a
"right" not to be subjected to trial in a forum that lacks jurisdiction over the matter,
or that is the improper venue, then it is indeed a right that necessarily must be
protected, if at all, before the litigation proceeds. See Redish, supra note 44, at 98

(suggesting that hardship exists where a trial court judgment "may require the parties

to expend substantial physical, financial and emotional effort in the preparation and
Other
conduct of a trial which may later prove to have been worthless").
commentators, however, disagree that such a right exists. See Frank, supra note 41, at
308-09 (arguing that expediting review to alleviate the hardship of being subjected to

trial would "do away with the distinction between interlocutory and final orders"
(internal quotation omitted)).

178. Requirement of a Final Judgment, supra note 43, at 526-27; see also Frank,

supra note 41, at 301-02 (arguing that cases after Curry and Langdeau "seem to
indicate that the element of harm is only incidental," as long as the state court
judgment is collateral to the merits, in that the "harm" is often simply the fact that
the order denies an asserted right).
179. Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 558; Curry, 371 U.S. at 550.
180. Curry, 371 U.S. at 550.
181. Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 558.
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subsequent cases, this list would expand."8 2 Finally, the Court
significantly altered the finality analysis by signaling a retreat from the
solemn considerations of federalism inherent in the final judgment
rule of § 1257; it simply did not discuss them, an omission which
Justice Harlan sharply criticized." 3
In sum, the considerable breadth of the Curry-Langdeaurule led to
general confusion over what types of judgments were reviewable, and
for what reasons. Critics lamented that there was "no apparent
limitation to seeking review under the new doctrine," provided that
the state court judgment presented a federal question that is
reviewable within the state system.'84 As a result, the cases broadened
the definition of final judgment to include decisions long considered
distinctly interlocutory. 85
In subsequent cases, the Court would continue to hold decisions
overruling a venue or jurisdictional objection to be final judgments.8 6
In addition, it would deem final judgments such as the grant or denial
of a preliminary injunction; 7 the denial of a litigant's claim where a
182. See infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
183. See Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 572 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority
in Curry and Langdeau for apparently forgetting that the final judgment rule is "a
long-standing and healthy federal policy that protects litigants and courts from the
disruptions of piecemeal review and forecloses this Court from passing on
constitutional issues that may be dissipated by the final outcome of a case, thus
helping to keep to a minimum undesirable federal-state conflicts").
184. Requirement of a FinalJudgment, supra note 43, at 527-28; see Dyk, supra note
43 at 910-11, 921-23 (noting that until 1963, the Court's finality jurisprudence had
been largely predictable, and that Curry and Langdeau signaled a significant
expansion of finality doctrine).
185. See, e.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 236 (1945) (stating that "denial
of a motion to dismiss, even when the motion is based upon jurisdictional grounds, is
not immediately reviewable"); Gibbons v. Ogden, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 448 (1821)
(considering, for the first time, the question of whether the Court may accept
jurisdiction of interlocutory decrees).
186. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648 (1992) (holding to be
final a Montana Supreme Court determination that a state venue statute was not
preempted by the venue provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act); Am.
Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 425 U.S. 637 (1976) (holding as final the Texas Supreme
Court's dismissal of appellant's application for writ of error on a Court of Civil
Appeals decision that the state's general venue statute does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Wright, supra note 33, at §
4010 (stating that the cases following Curry and Langdeau "clearly support the
conclusion that review is available whenever the highest state court finally rejects a
federal claim of immunity from state venue or jurisdiction rules").
187. See, e.g., Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). A trial court
enjoined petitioners from distributing leaflets to protest conduct by the respondent, a
local real estate broker, and the appellate court affirmed, finding that petitioners'
activities invaded respondents' right of privacy. Id. at 416-18. The state supreme court
denied the petitioner's motion for leave to appeal from the appellate court's order. Id.
at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting). By the time the petitioners' appeal reached the U.S.
Supreme Court, the temporary injunction had been in place for three years. Id. at 418.
The Court, in granting the appeal, explained that the temporary injunction was, for all
practical purposes, permanent, and had already had "marked impact" on petitioners'
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counterclaim remained unadjudicated; ss an order affirming a murder
conviction and awarding a new trial as to the sentence;' 89 and an order
overruling a demurrer and remanding for trial.' 90
Finality of state court judgments was no longer precluded by the
fact that the decision being appealed would ultimately merge into the
final judgment and therefore be reviewable at a later time, or that the
federal question being reviewed might be mooted by resolution of the
controversy on independent and adequate state grounds in
subsequent proceedings.
B. Tipping the Scales: The Court Articulates the Most Controversial
Exception to the FinalJudgment Rule
1. Miami Herald: The First Amendment in the Balance
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,19' the Court broke new
ground when it accepted an appeal from a state court decision whose
First Amendment rights. Id. at 418 n.1. While conceding that the matter was not
"entirely free from doubt," the Court concluded that it had the power to decide the
case. Id. Justice Harlan dissented, reiterating his argument that a preliminary
injunction is a classic form of interlocutory order, which Congress has not authorized
the Supreme Court to review. Id. at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan further
argued that the particular circumstances of this case-the fact that the state supreme
court had chosen not to rule on the issue-added to the inappropriateness of review
at the time. Id. at 422. Not only was the judgment not final, but it also did not emerge
from the "highest court of the [s]tate in which a decision could be had." Id. (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000)). Noting that the state had a strong policy against review
of interlocutory orders, Harlan argued that by intervening at this juncture, the
Supreme Court infringed on the state's autonomy over its own judicial processes. Id.
at 422-23. The Court should respect the policy decisions of states, regardless of how
flagrant the state error appears. Id. at 423.
188. See, e.g., Hudson Distrib. v. Eli Lilly, 377 U.S. 386 (1964). Hudson, a drug
distributor, sought a declaratory judgment that the Ohio Fair Trade Act, allowing
pharmaceutical makers to establish minimum retail prices, was unconstitutional. Id. at
387. Eli Lilly filed cross-petitions seeking injunctive relief and damages for Hudson's
failure to comply with the Act. Id. at 388. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the Act and remanded for further proceedings on Lilly's cross-petition to
enforce it. Id. at 388-89. Hudson appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. In a onesentence footnote, the Court sustained its jurisdiction by stating that, "[tihe fact that
separate and unresolved issues are pending in the Ohio courts and subject to 'further
proceedings' therein on the cross-petition does not render the judgment of the Ohio
Supreme Court on the issue here considered and decided nonfinal or unappealable
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257." Id. at 389 n.4 (citations omitted).
189. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85 (1963) (contravening the
traditional rule that a final judgment in a criminal case is the sentence, because "[i]t is
the right to a trial on the issue of guilt that presents a serious and unsettled question"
(internal quotation omitted)).
190. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 217 (1966) (holding that, since the
defendant conceded he had no state law arguments to press, a conviction was certain
and the case was essentially concluded). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes
116-21 and accompanying text.
191. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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harmful impact on the petitioner's rights was merely potential, rather
than immediate.
A candidate for public office had sued a newspaper for refusing to
print, allegedly in violation of a state statute, his reply to an editorial
that was critical of his qualifications. 192 The state supreme court
reversed a trial court determination that the statute was
unconstitutional on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 193 It
held that the constitution did not shield the petitioner from liability
under state law and remanded for a trial on the merits. 94 Despite the
remand for a full trial, the Supreme Court held that the judgment of
the state court on the federal issue was final, citing Snyder's Drug
Stores for authority. 195 In a footnote, the Court explained that, while
there was no injunction, the uncertainty over the constitutional

validity of the statute restricted the exercise of First Amendment

rights. 96 The situation was considered particularly urgent given the
upcoming elections.' 91 The Court concluded that "it would be
intolerable to leave unanswered, under these circumstances, an

important question of freedom of the press under the First
Amendment," and that "an uneasy and unsettled constitutional
posture of [the state statute] could only further harm the operation of
a free press."' 98 No Justices dissented from the Court's decision

regarding the final judgment rule.
The decision in Miami Herald originated, doctrinally, with Justices
Douglas and Brennan's concurrence in Mills v. Alabama, 99 in which
they argued forcefully that the potential abridgment of litigants' First
Amendment rights is serious enough to justify federal court review of
a non-final state court judgment."0 ° While the majority in Mills rather
succinctly established the Court's jurisdiction,"' Justices Douglas and
Brennan emphasized the "chilling effect" of the state court's judgment
192. Id. at 244.
193. Id. at 245.
194. Id. at 246.

195. Id. at 246-47 (citing N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc.,
414 U.S. 153 (1973)). However, Miami Herald differs in a significant way from
Snyder's Drug Stores. The latter is a case in which a denial of interlocutory review
would insulate the federal issue from Supreme Court review, as discussed in Cox. See
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 481-82 (1975). Such was not the case in
Miami Herald.

196. Miami Herald,418 U.S. at 247 n.6.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citations omitted).
199. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
200. Id. at 220-22 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Cox, 420 U.S. at 485 n.120
(stating that "[t]he import of the Court's holding in [Miami Herald] is underlined by
its citation of the concurring opinion in Mills v. Alabama").
201. Mills, 384 U.S. at 217-18 (concluding that subsequent trial court proceedings
would amount to nothing more than a formality "leading inexorably towards
[petitioner's] conviction," and that delaying review of the federal issue would be an
unnecessary waste of time); see supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.

2004]

A RETURN TO PRACTICALITY

on the exercise of free speech, and argued that the "importance of the
First Amendment rights at stake" dwarfed any regard for "some
remote, theoretical interests of federalism. 2 °2 The concurrence
proved to be a harbinger of the direction in which the Court was
heading.
2. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn: Articulating the Doctrine

The exception to the final judgment rule that enabled the Court to
review the state court decision in Miami Herald was institutionalized
the following year in Cox, in which the Court synthesized its final
judgment jurisprudence into a coherent doctrine. 203 The Miami
Herald decision laid the foundation for the fourth, and most
controversial, category of exception-a category into which the Cox
decision itself also fell.
At issue in Cox was whether a state may extend a cause of action
for invasion of privacy against a broadcaster for publicizing the name
of a deceased rape victim which had already been publicly revealed in
court papers.2" A trial court in Georgia granted summary judgment
in favor of the respondents, rejecting the petitioner's claims that a
state statute, prohibiting the news media from naming or otherwise
identifying a rape victim, 2 5 violated the petitioner's rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.2 6 The Georgia Supreme Court
sustained the statute's constitutionality, deeming it to be a "legitimate
limitation on the right of freedom of expression," as it could discern
no public interest
that would support the need to reveal the identity of
207
a rape victim.
The United States Supreme Court reversed on the merits, holding
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments preclude a state from
recognizing a cause of action under these circumstances.20 8 Before
doing so, it made the procedural determination that the judgment on
appeal was a final one.2°
The Court proceeded by laying out four categories of cases in which
it had treated as final a judgment of the highest court of a state that
finally resolved the federal issue in a case, despite the fact that further
proceedings were anticipated in the lower courts. 20" The first two
categories include cases in which the federal issue "would not be
mooted or otherwise affected by the proceedings yet to be had
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Mills, 384 U.S. at 221 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Cox, 420 U.S. at 482-83.
Id. at 472-74.
See id. (citing Ga. Code Ann. § 26-9901 (1972)).
Id. at 474.
Id. at 475 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 477-83.
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because those proceedings have little substance, their outcome is
certain, or they are wholly unrelated to the federal question. '21' The
second two categories comprise cases in which it was possible that the
federal question would be mooted were the petitioner to prevail on
independent and adequate state grounds, yet policy considerations
dictated the necessity of immediate review.212
The policy consideration controlling cases in the fourth category is
that "a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision might
'
In addition, cases in the fourth
seriously erode federal policy."213
category are characterized by the fact that reversal of the state court
on the federal issue would end the litigation, as the Court would have
determined that the state law under which the petitioner was being
held liable is unconstitutional. 14 If the Court's reversal of the
judgment would merely control the "nature and character of"
subsequent state court proceedings, or affect the admissibility of
evidence, then the judgment would not be considered final under this
exception.2 15
The Court granted review of the interlocutory order in Cox after
concluding that the case fell within this fourth category. 216 First, the
judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court on the federal questionthat the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not protect appellants
from a common law tort claim for invasion of privacy-was plainly
final.2 17 Second, the Court observed that it was possible that in
subsequent proceedings, the plaintiff would be unable to establish the
elements of the state cause of action and appellants would prevail,
thus mooting the constitutional question. 21s Third, a Supreme Court
decision that the constitution bars civil liability for broadcasting the
name of a rape victim would end the litigation. 219 And finally, a
failure to immediately decide the question would "leave the press in
211. Id. at 478; see supra Parts I.E.1-2.
212. Cox, 420 U.S. at 478-79; see supra Parts I.E.3-4.
213. Cox, 420 U.S. at 483.
214. Id. at 482-83.
215. Id. The opinion described the fourth category as covering those situations
where:
(1) the federal issue has been finally decided in the state courts; (2) further
proceedings are pending in state court; (3) the party seeking review might
prevail on the merits of nonfederal grounds, thus rendering review of the
federal issue by the Court unnecessary; (4) reversal of the state court on the
federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant
cause of action rather than merely controlling the nature and character of, or
determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state proceedings still to
come; and (5) refusal immediately to review the state-court decision might
seriously erode federal policy.
Id. at 479-83.
216. Id. at 485.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 486.
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Georgia operating in the shadow of the civil and criminal sanctions of
law and a statute the constitutionality of which is in serious
a rule of
,2 20
doubt.

Justice White, writing for the six-Justice majority, discussed three
cases as evidence that the Court was not treading on completely new
ground in concluding that the final judgment rule should be
subordinated to concerns of other federal policies-that the exception
articulated in Cox followed inexorably from precedent.
case was only tenuously applicable.222

Yet each

3. Criticisms of the Fourth Cox Category
The strongest criticisms of the fourth exception to the final
223
judgment rule are embodied in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Cox.

First, he argued that the Court ignored the importance of the

distinction between the final judgment rule of § 1291 and that of22 5§
1257.224 The former is based primarily upon an interest in efficiency
whereas the latter is grounded on a concern for how federal judicial

220. Id.
221. Id. at 483-85.
222. White cited Curry, in which the Court had determined that postponing review
"would seriously erode the national labor policy requiring the subject matter of
respondents' cause to be heard by the [NLRB], not by the state courts." Cox, 420 U.S.
at 483 (quoting Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen'l Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S.
542, 550 (1963)). Yet Curry also rested on the fact that the petitioner had no defense
other than its federal preemption claim, which meant that the matter was essentially
concluded. Id. This characteristic arguably pushed Curry outside the confines of the
fourth category, which includes cases in which it is possible for the federal question to
be mooted by the petitioner's victory on nonfederal grounds. See supra note 216.
Further distinguishing Curry was the fact that it involved a temporary injunction,
which threatened to "effectively dispose of petitioner's rights." Curry, 371 U.S. at 550.
White also cited Langdeau as stating that "it would serve the policy of the federal
statute" to resolve the venue question immediately rather than to subject the parties
to unnecessary litigation. Cox, 420 U.S. at 484 (citing Mercantile Nat'l Bank v.
Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)). This language suggests that the Court in
Langdeau was concerned with preventing the erosion of the federal venue policy.
However, a closer look at the opinion reveals that the Court was actually concerned
with effectuating the policy underlying the final judgment rule by expediting review.
See Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 558 (stating, "we believe that it serves the policy underlying
the requirement of finality in 28 U.S. C. § 1257 to determine now in which state court
appellants may be tried"(emphasis added)). Finally, White cited Miami Herald as
support for the argument that an exception to the final judgment rule is warranted
when important federal rights are at stake. Cox, 420 U.S. at 484. Yet the Court in
Miami Herald was concerned with resolving the freedom of press questions prior to
an upcoming election. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247 n.6
(1974). There was an urgency, therefore, that arguably was not present in Cox. See
also The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1024 (noting that neither Curry nor Miami
Herald, two of the three cases cited by White, support the view that "the significance
of the federal rights alone sustains an exception to finality rules").
223. Cox, 420 U.S. at 501-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 502-05.
225. Id. at 503.
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interference with state administrative and judicial functions could
impact our federal system.226 Rehnquist underscored his argument by
summarizing the views that Justices Frankfurter and Harlan expressed
in many past decisions
regarding the sanctity of the principles of
227
federalism and comity.
Second, Rehnquist accused the Court of "totally abandon[ing]" the
principle of constitutional avoidance.228 In Cox, unlike in Pope v.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.229 and Mills v. Alabama,3 ° appellants
had not conceded that they were without any nonfederal defenses.23 1
Therefore, it was possible for them to prevail on state law grounds,
making it unnecessary to decide the constitutional issues.2 2 Rather
than allow the state court to develop independent state grounds,
Rehnquist argued, the Court improperly "construe[d] § 1257 so that it
may virtually rush out and meet the prospective constitutional litigant
as he approache[d] [its] doors. ' 233 Rehnquist found this disregard for
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to be the "greatest difficulty
with the test enunciated" by the Court. 3 4
Third, Rehnquist was concerned about the degree to which the
application of the fourth exception would require, or at least tempt,
the Court to consider the merits of a case in advance of determining
its jurisdiction over the matter. 23 5 The language of the exception
provides that the state court judgment being appealed has to be one in
which reversal "would be preclusive of any further litigation.1 236 It
was not clear from the Court's opinion, he said, whether the Court
intended to apply the exception only to cases in which it was likely
that it would reverse the state court and thus terminate the

226. Id. at 502-03.
227. Id. at 503-05.
228. Id. at 509 ("[Tlhe greatest difficulty with the test enunciated today is that it
totally abandons the principle that constitutional issues are too important to be
decided save when absolutely necessary."). Rehnquist also quoted Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919), a case that articulated the constitutional avoidance
doctrine, stating that
"[c]onsiderations of propriety, as well as long-established practice, demand
that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress
unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function,
when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.
Id. at 509-10.
229. 345 U.S. 379 (1953); see supra Part I.E.1.
230. 384 U.S. 214 (1966); see supra Part I.E.1.
231. Cox, 420 U.S. at 510 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. Id.

234. Id. at 509.
235. Id. at 507.
236. Id. at 482-83.
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litigation.237 If so, Rehnquist argued, the Court would be "reversing
the traditional sequence of judicial decisionmaking."23
Finally, Rehnquist found the new exception to be "virtually
formless," one that was not supported by precedent and did not
promote the policies that made prior exceptions acceptable.239 While
he found redeeming qualities in exceptions previously carved out by
the Court, 240 he deemed the fourth exception to have insurmountable
barriers of practical application. In particular, he singled out the
Court's application of the "erosion of federal policy" prong of the test,
mocking its statement about leaving the press in Georgia operating in
"the shadow" of civil and criminal sanctions under a law whose
constitutionality is in "serious doubt. ' 241 The problem with this test,
Rehnquist argued, was that it did not require an inquiry into the
consequences of permitting the Georgia court's judgment to remain
undisturbed pending a final state court resolution of the case.242 As a
result, the majority "suggest[ed] that in order to invoke the benefit of
[the] rule, the 'shadow' in which an appellant must stand need be
neither deep nor wide. ' 243 The test also did not give any guidance for
when the constitutionality of the state law is in
how to determine
"serious doubt."'2 4" In other words, the test did not address how
clearly erroneous the state court judgment needed to be, or how grave
its impairment of the petitioner's rights. 245 The "inevitable" result
237. Id. at 507 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 507-08.
Heretofore, it has generally been thought that a court first assumed its
jurisdiction of a case, and then went on to decide the merits of the questions
it presented. But henceforth in determining our own jurisdiction we may be
obliged to determine whether or not we agree with the merits of the decision
of the highest court of a [sitate.
Id. Subsequent cases, however, have shown that the Court will apply the exception
regardless of whether reversal is likely. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,
491 n.5 (1983) (affirming the Kentucky Supreme Court's order that state law was not
preempted by federal law, and explaining that this affirmance "is not tantamount to a
holding that [the Court is] without power to render such a judgment; nor does it
require [the Court] to dismiss this case for want of a final judgment").
239. Cox, 420 U.S. at 505 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist explained that
Curry and Langdeau were based on the "understandable principle" that resolving
uncertainty, sooner rather than later, with respect to the proper forum for trying an
issue was "sound judicial administration." Id. at 505-06.
240. Id. at 506. It is surprising that Rehnquist did not take issue with the third Cox
exception. Possibly, he simply had decided to cut his losses and focus his energies on
the Cox decision itself-a category four decision. Indeed, he did not provide a ringing
endorsement in writing: "[EJach of [the first three exceptions] is arguably consistent
with the intent of Congress in enacting § 1257, if not with the language it used, and
each of them is relatively workable in practice." Id.
241. Id. at 486.
242. Id. at 508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. There was some support in the legal community for Rehnquist's argument that
the fourth Cox exception is "susceptible of virtually limitless expansion." See The
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would be increased burdens on the Court's docket, and serious delays
of the state judicial process.246
Given this, Rehnquist wondered, what principles would guide the
Court in applying the test to other cases?24 7 Is it enough if the highest
court of a state has ruled against any constitutional claim? If it is, he
the
lamented, then "we will have completely read out of [§ 1257]
248
limitation of our jurisdiction to a 'final judgment or decree.'
Rehnquist then wondered if the Court intended to limit its new

standard
of finality to cases in which a First Amendment freedom is at
issue. 249 This could not be so, he argued, because the language of §
1257 gives no indication that Congress intended to favor the First

Amendment over any others. 2 0 Therein lay the problem that has
continued to plague the Court's § 1257 finality jurisprudence since
Cox.
C. Inconsistency and Confusion: Application of the Fourth Cox
Category
The Court has applied the fourth Cox exception to a wide array of
cases in which a refusal to immediately review the federal issue
threatened to erode a significant federal policy. For example, the
Court has deemed sufficiently important the constitutional policy
against double jeopardy,251 federal preemption of state safety rules for
nuclear facilities,252 the Federal Arbitration Act's preemption of state
court jurisdiction, 53 the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over labor
Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1025 (arguing that the language does not clearly define
the scope of the exception because it fails to specify which federal policies and what
degree of erosion will trigger interlocutory review). But see McGinnis, supra note 40,
at 628, 645 (arguing that the fourth Cox exception is only narrowly applicable, and
represents a change that is "neither dramatic nor far-reaching").
246. Cox, 420 U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 508 (noting the difficulty in applying to other cases the requirement that
a federal right be exercised in the shadow of a law whose constitutionality is in
"serious doubt").
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971). The petitioner, who was
acquitted of murdering a man by sending a bomb through the mail and then
subsequently arrested and charged for another murder and an assault arising from the
same conduct, argued that the Constitution forbids a second trial against him. Id. at
55-56. The state court rejected this argument, and the Supreme Court held this
decision to be final for purposes of appeal. Id.
252. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988). The Ohio
Supreme Court held that the federal Atomic Energy Act did not preempt Ohio from
applying certain workers' compensation safety requirements. Id. at 177-78. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted an appeal of the state court's decision, concluding that, if the
petitioner were to prevail on independent state grounds, the unreviewed decision
"might seriously erode federal policy in the area of nuclear production." Id. at 179.
253. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1988) (holding as final a state court judgment that the Federal
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disputes, 25 4 and federal protection against being subjected to litigation

in certain state court venues. 2 51 The Court has been especially willing
to relax finality requirements to protect First Amendment free speech
rights from erosion,29 6 particularly where a state court has refused to

act in the face of an apparently unconstitutional restraint on speech.
For example, the Court has held as a final judgment a state court's

refusal to lift a restraint on media coverage, 257 as well as a failure to lift
an injunction preventing demonstrators from marching or to provide
for immediate appellate review.25 8 The Cox opinion suggests that the
Arbitration Act does not preempt a state arbitration statute); Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483 (1987) (reiterating the ruling that a state court judgment holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt a state arbitration statute is final);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (reviewing a state court judgment that
rejected petitioner's challenge to a state law as applied to invalidate a contract for
arbitration made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act). The Court in Keating
held that, without immediate review of the state judgment, "there may be no
opportunity to pass on the federal issue and as a result there would remain in effect
the unreviewed decision of the State Supreme Court holding that the California
statute does not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act." Id. at 6 (internal
quotations omitted).
254. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983). As in Curry, the
petitioners appealed a state court decision holding that the National Labor Relations
Act did not preempt respondents' state law claims. Id. at 493. The Court, quoting
Curry, held that a failure to immediately resolve the preemption question would
seriously risk eroding the federal statutory policy of requiring labor disputes to be
heard by the NLRB, rather than by state courts. Id. at 497-98 n.5.
255. Burlington R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648 (1992) (holding that the state
court's decision that Montana's venue rules, permitting a plaintiff to sue an out-ofstate corporation in any county, did not offend the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, was a final judgment).
256. Hart & Weschler, supra note 33, at 597; Redish, supra note 75, at 921
("Adjudicating the proper scope of First Amendment protections has often been
recognized by this Court as a "federal policy" that merits application of an exception
to the general finality rule.").
257. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1330 (1975) (holding that,
when a reasonable time in which to review a prior restraint on the news media has
passed, the Court may "properly regard the state court as having finally decided that
the restraint should remain in effect during the period of delay"). In other words, the
decision to delay consideration is itself a final decision, because each passing day
constitutes an irreparable injury to the petitioner's First Amendment rights. Id. at
1329.
258. See, e.g., Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
In Skokie, the state court enjoined petitioners, Nazi demonstrators, from marching in
Skokie. Id. The appellate court denied an application for a stay pending appeal, and
the Illinois Supreme Court denied both the stay and leave for an expedited appeal. Id.
at 44. The U.S. Supreme Court treated the petitioner's application to stay the
injunction as a petition for certiorari to review the refusal of the state supreme court
to issue a stay, and considered this refusal to be a final judgment. Id. The right to be
protected by the First Amendment during the period of appellate review, the Court
held, is a right "separable from, and collateral to" the merits. Id. (quoting Cohen v.
Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). Furthermore, the Court added, "[i]f
a State seeks to impose a restraint of this kind, it must provide strict procedural
safeguards." Id.; M.I.C. Ltd. v. Bedford Township, 463 U.S. 1341 (1983). In Bedford
Township, a Michigan trial court had entered a temporary injunction against a drive-
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sanctity of the freedom of speech may be enough to justify treating
First Amendment rights as preferred over other constitutional claims
for finality purposes, even without a prior restraint in place. 2 9
The Court's preference for safeguarding the First Amendment

seems apparent given its tendency to decline to apply the Cox
exception in cases that implicate other constitutional rights. In Flynt v.
Ohio,26 for example, the Court refused to grant immediate review of a
state court judgment denying a publisher's claim that criminal
complaints issued against it for dissemination of obscenity subjected it
to selective prosecution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.",
The Supreme Court held that the state court decision did not fall
within the fourth Cox category because review could be delayed until
final resolution of the case "without any adverse effect upon
' Applying an exception to the final
important federal interests."262

judgment rule in this case, the Court concluded, "would permit the
' The Court implied that, had
fourth exception to swallow the rule."263
the case implicated First Amendment rights (which it did not, as
obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment), its decision
would likely have been different.2 "
Assuming that the case did not implicate the First Amendment, the
decision raises the question of why a state court judgment that
allegedly violates a petitioner's rights under the Equal Protection

in movie theater for showing obscene films. Id. The Court of Appeals considered the
theater's application for a stay pending appellate review of the trial court's
preliminary injunction, but ultimately denied the stay. Id. at 1342. The Michigan
Supreme Court denied the petitioner's motion for review. Id. Justice Brennan
conceded that, as the state courts would ultimately review the trial court's decision to
enter an injunction, the judgment was "neither the final decision in [the] matter nor
one rendered by the State's highest court." Id. But, comparing the case to Skokie, he
explained that the Court has "repeatedly required" that when a [s]tate seeks to limit
certain kinds of expression, it must provide "strict procedural safeguards," including
immediate appellate review or a stay pending review. Id. at 1343 (internal quotations
omitted).
259. See Wright, supra note 33, at § 4010; Dyk, supra note 43, at 940-41 (stating that
orders of state courts chilling free speech are perhaps a "primary example" of the
kinds of "special" constitutional policies that may at times counsel against strict
application of the final judgment rule).
260. 451 U.S. 619 (1981).
261. Id. at 620.
262. Id. at 622.
263. Id.
264. Id. (explaining the fact that the case involves an obscenity prosecution does
not alter its conclusion because obscenity "is beyond the protection of the First
Amendment," and therefore the case involves merely a state effort to prosecute an
unprotected activity). Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the federal policy
affected by the state court judgment does fall squarely within the realm of the First
Amendment. Id. at 623-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the case implicates
"the interest in protecting magazine publishers from being prosecuted criminally
because state officials or their constituents are offended by the content of an
admittedly non-obscene political cartoon").
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Clause is any less problematic for the Court than a judgment that
allegedly infringes on First Amendment rights or a national labor
policy.
Eight years later, in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,265 the Court
considered two consolidated actions that also involved obscenity
prosecutions, yet this time concluded that judgments in both cases
implicated the First Amendment and therefore properly fell within
the fourth Cox category. Two adult bookstore operators were
separately charged with violating Indiana's Racketeer Influenced &
Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute by distributing obscene
material."6 In the first action, involving petitioner Sappenfeld, the
Indiana Supreme Court upheld an Indiana Court of Appeals
determination that the RICO statute was not unconstitutionally vague
as applied to obscenity predicate offenses.267 In the second action,
involving petitioner Fort Wayne Books, the trial court invoked the
state's Civil Remedies for Racketeering Activity ("CRRA") Act to
grant the state's request for injunctive relief, "directing the immediate
seizure" of the bookstore's property.2" The Indiana Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute as well as of the pretrial
seizure of Fort Wayne Books' property.269
The U.S. Supreme Court held that both cases fit within the fourth
category described in Cox, noting that it has often recognized the
clarification of the scope of the First Amendment as a "federal policy
that merits application of an exception to the general finality rule."27
Citing Miami Herald's language about the intolerability of leaving
important questions of freedom of the press unanswered, 271 the Court
stated that "[riesolution of this important issue of the possible limits
efforts to control
the First Amendment places on state and federal
272
organized crime should not remain in doubt.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion as to Fort Wayne Books
but dissented from the decision to grant review of the judgment in the
matter of petitioner Sappenfeld.273 While both actions involved an
appeal from an interlocutory order, only in the Fort Wayne action had
a pretrial sanction been imposed on the petitioner in the form of
seizure of property.274 O'Connor explained that interlocutory orders
are immediately reviewable where First Amendment interests are
265. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
266. Id. at 50.
267. Id. at 53.
268. Id. at 52-53.
269. Id. at 53.
270. Id. at 55 (citing Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43,
44 (1977)); Miami Herald Pub'l Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,246-47 (1974)).
271. Miami Herald,418 U.S. at 247.
272. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 56.
273. Id. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
274. Id. at 70.
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Indeed, the finality exception made in this case

was unremarkable when considered in light of other cases in which the
Court feared that a temporary injunction would stifle the petitioner's

exercise of free speech.2 76 The Sappenfeld action, however, did not
involve an injunction of any sort. Therefore, in O'Connor's view, the
Court's assumption of jurisdiction based on its desire to adjudicate the
proper scope of the First Amendment was "completely
unwarranted. 2 77 The disposition of the case, O'Connor
believed,
2 78

should have been governed by the Court's opinion in Flynt.
In general, the cases since Cox demonstrate that the Court has been
extremely inconsistent in its application of the final judgment rule
governing appeals from decisions of the state courts.2 79

It has

alternatively expanded and constricted its review, often failing to
provide any rationale for its decision and leaving it up to the

dissenting and concurring Justices to explicate the decision. 28 ° The
lack of a clear doctrine has perpetuated a regime of general
uncertainty. The dueling opinions rendered in Nike v. Kasky28 are a

reminder that this uncertainty remains as the Court once more
considers a more expansive reading of the final judgment rule.
III. THE FOURTH

Cox EXCEPTION

TODAY AND A PROPOSAL FOR

CHANGE

Part III.A argues that the fourth Cox exception to the final
judgment rule is fundamentally flawed, because it encourages the U.S.

Supreme Court to prematurely remove controversies from state
courts and engage in unnecessary, and potentially piecemeal, review
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977);
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
277. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the court's assumption of jurisdiction "essentially
expands the fourth Cox exception to permit review of any state interlocutory orders
implicating the First Amendment").
278. Id. at 69.
279. See Wright, supra note 33, at § 4010 (discussing the "complications of finality
analysis that have been introduced by the culminations of decisions before and since
[Cox]").
280. 22 Moore, supra note 76, at § 406.03[3][e]; see, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539
U.S. 654 (2003) (certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted, without discussion,
with lengthy concurring and dissenting opinions explaining the debate that likely led
to the decision); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 289 (1984) (asserting jurisdiction
to review appellate court reversal of a certified evidentiary ruling, without discussing
finality); O'Dell v. Espinoza, 456 U.S. 430, 430 (1982) (holding that a state court
decision was not final because the case had been remanded for trial, and noting
without discussion that the case did not fall within one of the Cox categories);
Armstrong v. Aiken, 429 U.S. 1078 (1977) (holding judgment not final, without
discussion). But see Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 142 (2003) (providing a
brief explanation of why tort case was not within any of the Cox categories).
281. 539 U.S. at 654.
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of federal questions. Part III.B summarizes other scholars' proposals
for altering the Court's exceptions to the rule, from procedural
changes that might ease the administrative burden of an unclear rule
on our judicial system, to a more substantive overhaul aimed at
delineating more precise exceptions. Part III.B then presents a new
proposal, adopting the general conclusion of past commentators that
articulating more precise and rational boundaries will best remedy
concerns about the unpredictable, and somewhat renegade, nature of
the current fourth Cox exception. Specifically, the Court should reject
the prong of the Cox test that encourages it to consider whether a
state court judgment threatens to erode federal policy, and replace it
with a consideration for whether the judgment threatens to
irreparably infringe the petitioner's federal rights.
A. A Critique of the Fourth Cox Exception
The fourth Cox exception to the final judgment rule is
It is, in the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist,
fundamentally flawed.
' attaching
"virtually formless,"282
few constraints to the Court's ability
to deem interlocutory judgments final for purposes of review, and
providing little guidance to litigants regarding appealability.
It is instructive to consider how markedly the fourth exception
differs from the first three, which were developed out of the Court's
traditional efforts to mitigate the harsh, and often absurd,
consequences of construing the final judgment rule too strictly.283 The
first exception encompasses cases in which the federal question would
be conclusive of subsequent proceedings because the petitioner lacks
any state law defenses to liability."&8 The second comprises cases in
which the federal question would survive to be reviewed regardless of
the outcome of the subsequent proceedings because it is collateral to
the merits of the case. 85 In both of these situations, interests of time
and efficiency weigh in favor of expedited review.286 The third
exception applies to cases in which state procedural laws would
preclude Supreme Court review of the federal question, regardless of
the outcome.2 87 This exception is somewhat problematic given its
application to cases in which the federal question could be later
mooted, but it is carefully circumscribed to apply only in
extraordinary circumstances.2 88
These three exceptions are well-defined, making it clear to litigants
which characteristics make a judgment "final" for purposes of
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 506 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See supra Part I.C.
Cox, 420 U.S. at 479; see supra Part I.E.1.
Cox, 420 U.S. at 480; see supra Part I.E.2.
See supra Parts I.E.1-2.
Cox, 420 U.S. at 481; see supra Part I.E.3.
See supra part I.E.3.
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appeal. 2 89 They are also rational, striking an appropriate balance
between the policies of § 1257 and compelling countervailing
interests. 29 They promote the efficient resolution of disputes by
allowing the state court to consider and rule on any federal questions
that might arise in the case, precluding the danger of piecemeal
review. 2 91 They foster sound judicial decision making by ensuring the
Court has before it a complete record of the proceedings below that
are relevant to the question before considering an appeal. 292 The
exceptions are protective of state judicial autonomy, allowing federal
intervention only after state courts develop any independent and
adequate state grounds that might resolve the matter. 293 They prevent
the Court from adjudicating constitutional questions prematurely.2 94
And finally, in many of the cases in these categories, expedited review
is further compelled by the fact that the state court's judgment
threatens to rob the 295
litigant of a right that must be vindicated
immediately or be lost.
Now consider the fourth exception. An analysis of the concurring
and dissenting opinions in Nike296 reveals its primary deficiencies and
underscores the wisdom of the Court's decision to dismiss certiorari in
the case as improvidently granted.
First, the fourth exception allows the Court to review judgments in
cases in which it is possible that the petitioner will prevail in state
court on nonfederal grounds, rendering review of the federal question
unnecessary. 297 The judgment on appeal in Nike was one declaring
that the company's statements were commercial speech, and that the
company would therefore be liable if its statements were proven to be
false and misleading. 9 8 If the plaintiff were unable to prove this, Nike
would prevail and it would be unnecessary for the Court to consider
the controversial commercial speech question. Application of the
fourth Cox exception to review a judgment in this situation ensures
that the Court wrests the controversy from the state court before it
has had the opportunity to consider adequate and independent state
grounds that may resolve the litigation. In doing so, the Court not
only interferes with state judicial processes in contravention of
principles of federalism and comity, 299 but renders what could amount
to an advisory opinion that may not have a substantial impact on the
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See supra Parts I.E.1-3.
See supra Parts I.E.1-3.
See supra Parts I.E.1-3.
See supra Parts I.E.1-3.
See supra Parts I.E.1-3.
See supra Parts I.E.1-3.
See supra Parts I.E.1-3.

296. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
297. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975).
298. Nike, 539 U.S. at 657.
299. See supra Part I.B.1.
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outcome of the case. 3° If the state court in Nike were to determine
after trial that the company's statements were not false or misleading
after all, then the company would not have been found liable in the
suit, regardless of whether the Supreme Court were to affirm or
reverse the state court on the question of commercial speech. A
Supreme Court opinion would therefore be advisory.
By preventing the operation of the adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine, the fourth Cox exception also enables premature
Justice Stevens
adjudication of the constitutional question.3 1'
explained in his Nike concurrence that when a case presents a federal
question of "novelty and importance," 3" it is more likely that the
correct answer will result "from the study of a full factual record,
rather than from review of mere unproven allegations in a
pleading."3 3
The Nike case demonstrates an additional concern with the fourth
Cox exception: it presents a risk that the Court will engage in
piecemeal review of federal issues, removing the efficiency benefits
that the final judgment rule is meant to confer.3 " While the exception
purports to require that a reversal of the state court decision by the
Supreme Court would be preclusive of further litigation on the
relevant cause of action,30 5 matters are not always that simple. True, if
the Court were to reverse outright the California Supreme Court's
decision that Nike's speech was commercial and therefore
unprivileged, it would be preclusive of further litigation because the
state court would be unable to hold Nike liable for any false or
misleading statements.3 6 Yet Justice Stevens pointed out that the
Court could actually take any one of several different paths in
deciding the question, some of which would neither preclude further
litigation nor finally resolve the First Amendment questions in the
case.30 7 It was possible that the Court might reverse the state court as
to some of Nike's statements, while affirming it as to others.30 8 This, in
turn, would mean that some of Nike's statements would be considered
300. See supra notes 75-78.
301. See supra Parts I.A.3, I.B.2.
302. Nike, 539 U.S. at 664 (Stevens, J., concurring). Many interests of the "highest
order" were at stake, such as the regulatory interest in protecting market participants
from being misled by misstatements intended to generate sales, and the interest in
protecting participants in a public debate about labor practices from the chilling effect
of the threat of litigation. Id.
303. Id.
304. See supra Part I.A.1.
305. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975) ("[R]eversal of the
state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on the
relevant cause of action rather than merely controlling the nature and character of, or
determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state proceedings still to come.").
306. Nike, 539 U.S. at 658-59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
307. Id. at 659-60.
308. Id.
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commercial, leading to further state court proceedings on the legal
standards governing commercial speech. 30 9 Alternatively, the Court
could reverse the state court's decision by holding that, while Nike's
statements may be commercial, they can only lead to liability if made
with malice.31 0 This decision would invite the plaintiff to amend his
complaint to allege such malice, and a trial would still ensue.
Given the proliferation of possibilities, Stevens concluded, it was
not clear that a reversal by the Supreme Court would be preclusive of
further litigation. 312 And, as additional First Amendment issues could
yet arise in the case, it was not clear that providing immediate review
of the federal question would serve the goal of efficiency.3 13 In other
words, it was likely that additional federal questions would come up to
the Court in a piecemeal fashion, defeating one of the final judgment
rule's earliest policy rationales.3 14
Justice Breyer, arguing in dissent, was apparently ready to overlook
the deficiencies in the posture of the case.3 1 His willingness to do so
stemmed from his confidence that it was such a "highly realistic
possibility" that the Court would flatly reverse the state court, that it
was unnecessary to engage in idle theorizing about other potential
dispositions of the case. 316 He then devoted the majority of his finality
argument to discussing why this was so. 317 This line of argument
underscores an additional problem with the fourth Cox exception: it
invites the Court to consider the merits of a case in advance of
determining its jurisdiction over the matter in the first place. If the
Court sets out to apply the fourth exception only to cases in which it is
likely that a decision will terminate the litigation, it is "reversing the
traditional sequence of judicial decisionmaking," as Justice Rehnquist
observed in his dissent from the Cox decision.31 8 In addition, this
determination can be nothing more than guesswork, as it is being
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See supra Part I.A.1.
315. Breyer conceded that it was possible for the Court to opt for some disposition
other than full reversal. Yet he urged that this possibility was irrelevant, as the
language of the third prong of the exception specifies "reversal," not some other
disposition. Nike, 539 U.S. at 675 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He then went on to discuss
why a full reversal was likely. Breyer further conceded that there is a likelihood that
other related federal constitutional issues might arise upon remand for trial. Yet, he
argued "some such likelihood is always present in ongoing litigation." Id. at 673. He
pointed out that this likelihood was present in Cox to support his argument that it
should not matter in Nike. Id. This admission, however, more readily serves as
support for an argument that the prongs of the fourth exception are so susceptible to
loose interpretation as to be vacuous.
316. Id. at 675.
317. Id. at 676-81.
318. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1975).
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made without the benefit of a full record or a full consideration of all
the possible outcomes.
Perhaps the most important concern with the fourth Cox exception
is with its final prong-that the Court must determine that refusal to
immediately review a state court judgment "might seriously erode
federal policy."3 9 This test has remained completely devoid of any
limiting principle. The Court has never provided guidance regarding
how important a federal policy must be, nor how serious the risk or
how great the potential erosion, in order for a petitioner to benefit
from the exception. Instead, litigants have been left to guess whether
they should expend the time and energy appealing an interlocutory
ruling, and the Court has been left with carte blanche to decide which
policies are important enough to warrant special solicitude.
In practice, the Court has seemed particularly protective of First
Amendment questions.32 Yet it has never explained why it is less
tolerable to allow the press to "operate in the shadow" of civil and
criminal penalties of dubious constitutionality32 than to allow any
other party to operate in the shadow of restraints on other
constitutional rights. This disparity might be explained by reference
to the vast scholarly research arguing that the First Amendment
occupies a "preferred position" within the hierarchy of constitutional
However, this preference for protection of First
values.322
Amendment values does not account for expedited Court action
where the exercise of free speech is not in imminent danger, as when
there is no prior restraint in place. Nor does it account for elevated
protection of other federal policies beyond the First Amendment.
Furthermore, while some cases in this category have presented
situations in which the petitioner would have suffered irreparable
harm if the state court judgment was not immediately reviewed,32 3
others have presented no harm beyond the disappointment
encountered by all litigants who receive an unfavorable 3interlocutory
24
ruling and must, as a result, continue litigating the matter.

319. Id. at 483.
320. See supra Part II.C.
321. Cox, 420 U.S. at 486.
322. See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, First Amendment Law 10 (1999)
(explaining that Justice Black was a proponent of the "absolute" view of First
Amendment rights, while Justices Frankfurter and Harlan advocated balancing these
rights against competing interests); Robert B. McKay, The Preferencefor Freedom, 34
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1182 (1959) (noting that a debate exists over whether the First
Amendment "stands somehow apart from, and above, other provisions" to the
Constitution, and arguing that it clearly does).
323. See, e.g., M.I.C. Ltd. v. Bedford Township, 463 U.S. 1341 (1983); Nat'l Socialist
Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327
(1975).
324. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988); Cox, 420 U.S.
at 469; Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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In sum, the fourth Cox exception to the final judgment rule suffers
from a lack of specificity that renders it grossly overinclusive, less an
exception than a catch-all by which the Court may grant review of
virtually any interlocutory judgment not falling within one of the first
three Cox categories, as long as the Court determines that the
judgment poses a risk to a federal policy. It is often applied in ways
that fly in the face of constitutional avoidance doctrine and that
disrupt the "smooth working of our federal system" of which Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan spoke,325 while serving neither efficiency nor
litigant protection interests. In contravening Congress's clear intent
to retain the finality requirement in all appeals from state courts to
the Supreme Court,326 the Court should require a demonstration of
compelling reasons why it must do so.
B. Modifying the Fourth Cox Exception to Increase Certainty and
Practicalityin the Application of the FinalJudgment Rule
1. Previous Proposals
Very little recent legal scholarship exists critiquing the appealability
regime of § 1257. Yet a great deal was written during the period
leading up to and immediately following Cox, a period during which
the exceptions to the final judgment rule were substantially expanded.
Many commentators argued that the Court's later exceptions to the
final judgment rule are untenable for any number of reasons. One
argued that the new rule was both underinclusive and overinclusive,
and advocated an amendment to § 1257 that would clarify the
availability of appeal in rare cases.327 Another decried that expansive
review ignores federalism concerns, and implored the Court to
"retreat from [its] present position. 3 28 Another scholar stated that
three of the four Cox categories create "disturbing unpredictability in
application," sacrificing the "systemic benefit gained by predicating
appellate jurisdiction upon finality. ' 329
This author proposed
delineating precise exceptions for situations including practical
finality, state court judgments that threaten time-bound rights, and
assertions of rights to be free from the burdens of litigation or from
injunctive orders.33 0
Other commentators were not convinced that wholesale change to
the finality doctrine was warranted, suggesting that the problem with
the Court's new interpretation of finality was largely administrative.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 320 U.S. 120, 124 (1945).
See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
Dyk, supra note 43, at 944.
Frank, supra note 41, at 320.
The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1026.
Id. at 1027-32.
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The impact of the Cox decision, one scholar said, would be "neither
dramatic nor far-reaching. ' 33 While the definition of finality that it
articulated could lead to a deluge of appeals, he suggested this could
be remedied by making interlocutory appeals permissive rather than
mandatory, thus quelling any fears of forfeiture, and by imposing
sanctions to deter frivolous, dilatory appeals.332 The problem with this
reasoning, however, is that while a permissive appeal rule may
eliminate a fear that one would risk making his appeal untimely if he
waits too long, it would not remove the incentive to appeal sooner
rather than later. Many litigants would likely deem the costs of
appealing an adverse ruling to be far outweighed by the potential
benefit of having their grievances heard before having to litigate an
entire case. In addition, an ill-defined exception whose limits are
unclear would make it difficult to determine whether an appeal is
frivolous, warranting sanction, or simply opportunistic.
Even if one were to accept that procedural rules could mitigate
administrative burdens, the fact remains that the fourth Cox exception
is deficient for all of the substantive reasons outlined above. As Nike
demonstrates, there are Justices on the Court who support a
continued application of the exception it its most expansive form,
inviting review of judgments solely out of a desire to weigh in sooner
on a constitutional question. The time is therefore ripe to revisit it
and to propose a change.
2. A New Proposal
The fourth Cox exception to the final judgment rule should be
modified to reject the prong of the test that considers erosion to
federal policy, and replace it with a consideration only for the
petitioner's interests. When a litigant appeals an interlocutory state
court judgment on a federal question, yet has a real opportunity to
prevail on nonfederal grounds (including settlement), the Supreme
Court should entertain the appeal only when expedited review is truly
necessary to protect the petitioner from irreparable harm.
Such harm should not include the physical, financial, or emotional
expenditures that a petitioner must undertake to prepare for and
conduct litigation. In other words, the requirement is not met merely
by claiming that a state court judgment will subject the petitioner to
further litigation that might ultimately prove unnecessary if it turns
out the state court was mistaken on the federal question. If it were,
then any denial of a motion for summary judgment or motion to
dismiss would be appealable.

331. McGinnis, supra note 40, at 645.
332. Id.
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It may be argued that this rule would contradict cases such as Curry
and Langdeau, because challenges to venue and jurisdiction are
merely arguments that the petitioner should not be subjected to
litigation in a particular forum. Yet these cases may be distinguished
from other pre-trial and interlocutory judgments by the fact that the
right for which the petitioner seeks vindication is collateral to the
merits of a case. Furthermore, the federal right asserted is a right
specifically designed to protect the petitioner from being forced to
litigate in a particular state forum.3 33 Once the litigation has been
concluded, the right has been lost irreparably.
Under the proposed rule, however, irreparable harm would not be
deemed to flow from the fact that a state court judgment upholding
the validity of a state statute against federal challenge will force the
petitioner, and those similarly situated, to operate in an atmosphere of
uncertainty over the legality of their behavior. Appeals of judgments
such as those in Cox, Miami Herald, and Nike, which denied
petitioners' First Amendment defenses and remanded for further
proceedings, leaving intact a state law of questionable validity, would
therefore be impermissible. Such judgments merely maintain the
status quo, imposing no additional burdens on the petitioner that he
had not already been subjected to-burdens which can be just as
effectively vindicated at the conclusion of the litigation.
In contrast, a judgment of the highest state court refusing to stay a
trial court's injunction, or to provide immediate appellate review of
the injunction, should always be appealable under an irreparable
harm exception.334 This kind of pre-trial sanction alters the status quo,
effecting a complete restraint on the litigant's conduct for what could
be a period of years, such that even if the litigant ultimately vindicates
his rights, significant damage will have already been done. The
paradigm example involves an injunction against speech. If the
petitioner violates the injunction by participating in the prohibited
speech, the collateral bar rule provides that he would be held in
contempt of court and would forfeit his right to challenge the validity
of the law under which he was enjoined.3 If he obeys the order, he
may effectively lose his speech rights altogether, as preliminary
injunctions can remain in effect long enough at least to render the
right moot. It is therefore a complete restraint.
Contrast this to a judgment such as that in Cox, Miami Herald, or
Nike, which simply rejects a petitioner's first amendment defense to
liability and remands for further proceedings. The petitioner remains
333. See The Finality Rule, supra note 42, at 1030.
334. See id. at 1031 (suggesting that "when the litigant can point to a specific
federal constitutional or statutory provision that deprives a state court of the
authority to issue a preliminary injunction.., he should be able to resolve his claim of
privilege before the interlocutory injunction goes into effect").
335. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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free to speak and, while the threat of facing damages may have a
chilling effect on his speech, he is not subjected to enforced silence. In
other words, "although the threat of damages or criminal action may
chill speech, a prior restraint 'freezes' speech before the audience has
the opportunity to hear the message. 336
It seems appropriate, therefore, for the Court to make an exception
to the final judgment rule where the state courts have demonstrated
an unwillingness to protect the petitioner's rights by either staying or
providing expedited review of the injunction.337 As the Court held in
Forgay, a "right of appeal is of very little value" to a petitioner if "he
'
may be ruined before he is permitted to avail himself of the right."338
Modifying the fourth Cox exception in this way would effectuate
the Court's original desire to give a practical construction to an
otherwise draconian rule, by allowing the Court to review a non-final
state court judgment when, as a practical matter, review at a later date
would be inefficient, difficult, or impossible. Yet it draws a sensible
line, where none currently exists. This proposal recognizes that the
final judgment rule is not merely a relic of the past, but a doctrine
whose value is still apparent, and that the formality of our reasons for
departing from it should mimic in magnitude the degree of that
departure. In cases where it is clear that the state court judgment on
the federal issue is determinative of the outcome of any subsequent
state court litigation and will be sent up for review to the Court in
short order, it is not as critical that the Court apply a methodical
analysis to whether the decision is one that has, for time immemorial,
been considered "final." It makes practical sense to expedite review.
However, in cases where the state court judgment on the federal issue
is plainly interlocutory, with an entire trial yet to be conducted in
which the petitioner may well prevail on the merits, it is not at all clear
that granting immediate review is the practical choice. In fact, it is
decidedly impractical to grant review in such cases unless the parties
will be unfairly and irreparably impacted by a delay. The fanciful goal
of preserving the sanctity of ill-defined federal policies against merely
hypothetical risks of erosion simply does not fit with the pragmatic
spirit of the Court's traditional finality jurisprudence. If we are to
return to that pragmatic approach, we must craft a finality doctrine
that balances in each case the risks of abandoning the rule against
tangible interests in the efficient and fair resolution of the
controversy, in a way that provides clear guidance to litigants
regarding when to seek and expect review of an interlocutory order.
336. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1346 (1st Cir. 1986).
337. See Wright, supra note 33, at § 4010 (explaining that while in most cases,
"finality should be denied if later review will be available in a higher state court,"
there are "some pressing situations" in which it "may be sufficient that no present
review is available in a higher state court"(emphasis added)).
338. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 205 (1848).
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